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ABSTRACT
A case study of the CO-MADRES (Committee of Mothers and Relatives of Political
Prisoners, Disappeared, and Assassinated Persons of El Salvador) was used to test the
validity of theories that argue only feminista (feminist) organizations represent the strategic
gender interests that challenge gender inequality. The case was constructed through
interviews with Maria Teresa Tula (a representative of the CO-MADRES), internal
documents (collected at the CO-MADRES D.C. office), and some secondary literature.
The results from the case study showed that the CO-MADRES, a non-feminist women's
organization, politically represented strategic gender interests. Additionally, this particular
case showed a strong correlation between the extent of political opportunities for the
representation of strategic gender interests and the degree to which the CO-MADRES
represented those interests. The case showed some of the fallacies in dominant theories
about Latin American women's organizations, and some of the strengths of emerging
alternative theories.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Jonathan Fox
Title: Associate Professor of Political Science

Introduction
During the nineteen seventies and eighties, while authoritarianism dominated the
region, Latin American women's participation in political organizations became
increasingly visible. Women participated in a wide range of organizations, conservative
and progressive, some of which included men as well as women. The increasing number
and visibility of political organizations that included only women, however, attracted
attention within the academic community. Though run by women, the scope of issues
addressed by these organizations extended beyond issues that primarily affected women:
women's political organizations included human rights organizations, women's branches
of labor unions, and popular economic organizations. Although some of the new
women's organizations identified themselves as feminist, the majority did not organize
around issues of gender inequality (Corocan-Nantes 1993: 139).
A dominant theme within the literature about contemporary Latin American women's
organizations is the effect the different types of organizations have on the representation of
women's interests. Scholars of Latin America as well as Latin American activists
commonly distinguish between the movimiento femenino (women's movement)' and the
S"Movimiento femenino" (or movimento femenina in Portuguese) is frequently translated to "feminine
movement." This translation, however, is problematic because the term feminine in English carries
connotations femenina does not necessarily carry in Spanish or Portuguese: although femenina, like
feminine, can describe certain "womanly" characteristics, it is also used to describe gender. When the term
is used to describe gender translating femenina to feminine is at the very least an awkward translation and at
its worst, misleading. Consider, for example, the translation of Rama Femenina (of a political party) to
"Feminine Branch." The translation is both more awkward and confusing than a translation to "Women's
movimiento fiminista (feminist movement).2  Femenina organizations typically mobilize
within traditional gender roles (as good mothers and caretakers) when they engage in
political activity (Singer and Brant 1982: 16-17). Feminista organizations, on the other
hand, openly challenge the legitimacy of those traditional gender roles and the sexual
division of labor (Singer and Brant 1982: 16-17). Feminist scholars make a parallel
distinction between practical and strategic gender interests. In a seminal article about Latin
American women's movements, Maxine Molyneux defines women's practical gender
interests in terms of women's material needs as they fulfill their daily responsibilities:
acquiring sufficient food for family members often fulfills part of a woman's role as
caregiver, so Molyneux would consider this a practical gender interest (Molyneux 1985:
233). She defines strategic gender interests as interests rooted in the struggle for gender
equality: thus she considers equal treatment under the law a strategic gender interest
(Molyneux 1985: 233). Scholars generally expect femenina organizations to represent
practical gender interests and feminista organizations to represent strategic gender interests.
Because the femenina organizations generally organize within traditional roles as
mothers, wives, or caregivers, some feminist scholars argue that these organizations reify
rather than challenge gender inequality (Feijo6 and Gogna 1990; Jaquette 1991; Perelli
Branch." A women's branch of a party in the United States would not be called a "feminine" division. The
use of feminine branch might lead the reader to believe that the organization promoted certain types of
womanly behavior, whether or not it actually does. In order to avoid falsely attributing characteristics to
diverse organizations, I will use the Spanish terms femenina and feminista except when another scholar
translates the term to feminine (Conversations with Jonathan Fox, Sandra Aidar, Pablo Policzer and Marga
Gomez-Reino helped to clarify my thinking on this issue).
2 This distinction addresses the question of difference between progressive women's organizations: the
categories do not include conservative women's organizations. Scholars of Latin American women's
organizations have generally neglected study of conservative women's organizations in recent years,
although there have been important exceptions (recent studies include Fisher 1993; Molina 1989). A
number of studies analyze the Poder Femenino (Women's Power) of Chile (see Chaney 1974; Crummett
1977; Mattelart 1975) but studies of more contemporary organizations, such as the Frente Femenina
(Women's Front) of El Salvador, have not yet received serious treatment by Latin Americanists. The bias
in recent literature towards the study of progressive women's organizations leaves the question of the degree
to which conservative women's organizations have created new and durable channels of representation for
women's interests not only unanswered but unasked.
1991). Other scholars see the dominance of immediate practical gender interests as an
additional constraint on the ability of femenina organizations to identify and confront
barriers to gender equality (Barrig 1991; Chiriac and Padilha 1982). These
characterizations of fernenina organizations lead some analysts to argue that the new
organizations are part of a crisis mobilization of women: women only move into the
political arena to fulfill domestic responsibilities during periods of political and economic
crisis, and will abandon the political arena in favor of domestic responsibilities when the
crisis subsides.
Recent case studies, however, indicate that femenina organizations can represent
both practical and strategic gender interests, though these studies do not provide adequate
analysis of the degree to which the organizations represent strategic interests politically
(Stephen 1991,1992; Lind 1992; Schirmer 1988, 1993). 3 Recent studies focus on the
social representation of strategic gender interests: challenges the femenina organizations
pose to gender inequality through the transformation of individual women who participate
in the organizations (Jelin 1990; Lind 1992). Though microresistance can play a critical
role in transforming power relations within society, strategic gender interests must also be
represented within formal political institutions in order to change laws and policies that
underpin women's social and political inequality.4  An argument that the femenina
3 While nearly any question of power relations can be treated as a political problem, I will be using the term
"political representation" to refer to the representation of interests which demand a response from the state.
A more broadly defined conception of the political fails to distinguish between "social" representation of
strategic gender interests through day-to-day practices and the representation of interests which specifically
target political institutions as the agents of change. While social and political representation of strategic
gender representation may overlap, this distinction is necessary to bring out the role femenina organizations
play in challenging the policies and institutions which enforce gender inequality.
4 Sonia Alvarez argues this point in Engendering Democracy in Brazil : "Latin American women's
movements, like women's movements everywhere, have multiple cultural and social goals that cannot be
pursued solely through the policy process; they seek attitudinal, behavioral, and normative changes that
must be pursued within and outside the State and political society. But there are many changes in women's
subordinate status that must be pursued primarily, if not exclusively within the confines of formal
institutions-changes in the laws governing marriage, the family, conception and contraception, women's
work, women's sexuality, and so on" (Alvarez 1990).
organizations created new channels of political representation for women's interests during
the nineteen seventies and eighties should address the degree to which femenina
organizations represent strategic interests within the political arena.5
A related absence in the literature is adequate analysis of the relationship between
external political conditions and the capacity of femenina organizations to politically
represent strategic gender interests. A few scholars suggest that dependence of femenina
organizations on allies such as the Catholic Church establishes external constraints on an
organization's capacity to represent strategic gender interests (Alvarez 1990; Chiriac and
Padilha 1982). For the most part, however, feminist scholars have left the subject of
external political constraints and opportunities unexplored: while the dominant literature
neglects this issue because it assumes femenina organizations are inherently unwilling to
represent strategic gender demands, the emerging alternative literature fails to address this
question because it neglects femenina organization's political agendas.
I will address the following questions: To what extent can a femenina organization
represent strategic gender interests politically? What is the nature of the relationship
between external political conditions and a femenina organization's capacity to represent
strategic gender interests? Under what conditions does a femenina organization politically
represent strategic interests?
5 1 define collective interests as the full range of objectives an organization embraces, whether those
interests are publicly prioritized or not. An organization's objectives may range, for example, from
providing new public housing to socializing medicine, but the full range of objectives may not be apparent
to the general public. If those objectives are internally defined as collective goals, whether or not they are
prioritized for action at any given time, then I would define them as an organization's interests. Whether or
not an organization represents certain interests, however, is necessarily a question about their activism
around an issue. If a group is not active around an objective which they embrace, I would not consider
them to represent that interest. If a group does take action on a certain issue, then I would consider them to
represent that interest. Although there are important variations in the degree to which organizations
represent different interests (how much activity they devote to one issue as opposed to another) or the
particular form the representation takes (whether it is political representation or social representation), the
key distinction between a group which represents an interest and one which does not is whether they are
acting on that interest at any given time.
The CO-MADRES of El Salvador pose a compelling "crucial case study" for the
utility of existing theory about women's organizing in Latin America (Eckstein 1975: 189-
119). CO-MADRES is one of many "motherist" human rights organizations which Latin
American women established under authoritarian regimes. 6  CO-MADRES is best
described as a femenina rather feminista organization because its members mobilize around
their rights as mothers.7 In recent years, however, CO-MADRES began to represent
strategic gender interests politically while they continued to present themselves as a
mother's organization rather than a feminista organization. As a femenina organization that
represents strategic gender interests, CO-MADRES tests the boundaries of current
theorizing about women's organizing in Latin America. In the case of CO-MADRES,
political conditions provided significant constraints and opportunities that affected the range
of strategies available to represent group interests and frequently provided different kinds
of strategic opportunities or interests for varying types of interests.
The CO-MADRES demonstrated the capacity to represent strategic gender interests
as political opportunities for representing gender interests gradually expanded. Resources
from external sources and the construction of new channels of representation were critical
to the expansion and politicization of the CO-MADRES gender agenda. In particular, the
6 Motherist groups are human rights organizations which base their challenge to human rights abuses of
authoritarian regimes on their rights as mothers to protect and care for their children (Schirmer 1993).
Motherist organizations utilize traditional gender roles in order to mount a powerful challenge to
authoritarian states: "In their protest, these women fulfill traditional expectations and at the same time
violate them. These are women who expected to live out an ideology of "separate spheres" in which men
and women had complementary tasks. Whatever ideology of the sexual division of labor they may have
espoused, their political circumstances , as well as the apparent greater vulnerability and conventionality of
the men they lived among, required they act publicly as women" (Ruddick 1989: 229). Other examples of
motherist organizations include the Argentinean Madres of the Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de
Mayo) and the Chilean Agrupaci6n de Familiares Detenidos-Desaparecidos (Association of Relatives of the
Detained-Disappeared) (Chuchryk 1991; Feijo6 1991; Navarro 1989; Schirmer 1988).
7 A consistent justification for the CO-MADRES political work is their right as mothers to find their
children. The justification is deeply rooted in Catholic gender ideology: comparisons between Mary's
suffering as she watched her son die and the suffering of the CO-MADRES are frequent in the organization's
literature. From this ideology, the CO-MADRES claim special rights for mothers to oppose the state:
through their suffering mothers have intimate knowledge of the injustice of state repression.
development of new, more independent coalitions of women's organizations created
important new channels for representing women's gender interests. National political
conditions in El Salvador changed substantially after the signing of the peace accordsin
1991: the government became less repressive and more responsive to opposition demands,
and opposition leaders began to establish positions within institutional politics. Under
these conditions, the CO-MADRES demonstrated increasing capacity to represent strategic
gender interests.
I focus on two key variables in this project: (1) the effect of external political
conditions on the CO-MADRES and the range of strategic choices available to them and (2)
the interests represented by CO-MADRES as those conditions change. My analysis of
political conditions relies on the secondary literature about Salvadoran politics, while I base
my analysis of the effect of those conditions on the CO-MADRES and the interests
represented by CO-MADRES mainly on primary sources (including newsletters, press
releases, internal documents and interviews by the author). Interviews with Maria Teresa
Tula, the U.S. representative of CO-MADRES, and internal documents have been critical
to this project.
Chapter One provides a survey of the current debate about femenina organizations.
The framework developed by Maxine Molyneux can provide useful analytical tools to
distinguish between different types of gender interests. Other scholars who rely on her
framework, however, frequently dichotomize the interests of femenina and feminista
organizations by linking femenina organizations exclusively to the practical and feminista
organizations to the strategic. An emerging literature relies on an alternative framework
that treats strategic and practical interests as part of a continuum. Though a one-
dimensional continuum does overcome the problematic dichotomization within the
dominant literature, it is difficult to use to map change over time. I propose an alternative
two-dimensional framework for analyzing the changing patterns of gender interest
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representation by women's organizations, which will prove more useful in illustrating
change over time.
Chapter Two turns to three alternative schools of thought to explain the relationship
between the development of grassroots organizations and external political conditions: new
social movement theory, resource mobilization theory, and the political process model.
Though new social movement and resource mobilization theories provide valuable insights
as to internal and external influences on the development of movement organizations, only
the political process model deals extensively and directly with the relationship between
political opportunities and constraints and the development of movement organizations. A
modified version of Sidney Tarrow's political process model provides the basis for my
analysis the development of CO-MAIDRES agenda.
The remaining three chapters trace the development of the CO-MADRES agenda
between 1977 and 1993. Chapter Three outlines the general political conditions in El
Salvador from 1977 to 1981, years of considerable political turmoil and high levels of
repression. The chapter also focuses on the specific consequences of those conditions on
the CO-MADRES: how the increasingly political role of Archbishop Romero facilitated a
strong alliance between the Church and the CO-MADRES; how the failure of government
officials to respond to formal political institutions lead to the strategic choice to use extra-
institutional channels; how, after 1980, increasing repression forced the CO-MADRES to
engage in less public activity. During this period, the CO-MADRES used extra-
institutional means with the assistance of its allies to advance a practical gender agenda, but
did not advance strategic gender interests politically.
Chapter Four explores the impact of political openings that occurred through
electoral liberalization, negotiations between the FMLN and the Duarte administration
between 1982 and 1988, and international pressure. Although the openings provided
something less than democracy, they did have a significant impact on the range of strategies
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available to the CO-MADRES. Though the Church became a less consistent ally during
this period, the CO-MADRES began to strengthen alliances with the domestic opposition
and international actors. The new allies provided important material and political support
for the expansion of their practical agenda and for the first political actions around a
strategic gender interest.
The final chapter traces the development of CO-MADRES between the election of
President Cristiani and the release of the U.N. Truth Commission's report. Though
repression continued through this final period, there were significant openings in
institutional politics: several parties of the left participated in the 1989 and 1991 elections;
six officials of the left-wing Democratic Convergence were elected to the legislature in
1991; and the FMLN was recognized as a legal political organization in the peace accords.
The CO-MADRES began to pursue new strategies during this period, the most prominent
of which has been the development of coalitions of women's organizations that focused on
influencing political party agendas and electoral outcomes. Through coalitions with other
women's organizations, the CO-MADRES has increased its political activism around both
practical and strategic gender interests.
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Chapter One: A Re-evaluation of Women's Gender Interests
The distinction between types of gender interests greatly influences the analysis of
contemporary Latin American women's movements.8  The terminology provides a
necessary vocabulary to describe variations in the women's interests: problems that arise
from gendered inequality are not the only interests women's organizations address, though
the label "women's issues" frequently refers only to those interests. Scholars commonly
link the distinction between practical and strategic gender interests to the distinction
between femenina and feminista organizations by arguing that femenina organizations
represent practical gender interests and feminista organizations represent strategic gender
interests. Recent critiques present a compelling argument that the analytical connection
between feminista organizations and strategic gender interests and femenina organizations
and practical interests inaccurately dichotomizes the interests of Latin American women's
organizations: new case studies show that femenina organizations do not limit their agenda
exclusively to practical gender interests. Some critics suggest an alternative framework that
measures interests along a continuum between the practical and the strategic rather than
within rigid and dichotomous categories. The continuum framework is difficult to use to
map changes in an organization's practical or strategic interests over time: it does not
8 Similar distinctions, such as Temma Kaplan's distinction between female and feminist consciousness, are
also used to discuss women's political participation in Western Europe and the U.S.
13
provide clear guidelines for measuring the degree to which an organization represents
practical or strategic interests. At the end of this chapter, I will present a two-dimensional
framework with clear guidelines for measuring the strategic and practical interests women's
organizations represent, with the intent to create a framework that allows greater flexibility
than the dichotomy framework and greater utility than the one-dimensional continuum
model.
Defining the Terms: Femenina vs. Feminista, Strategic vs. Practical
Paul Singer and V.C. Brant develop one of the most influential definitions of the
popular distinction between femenina and feminista. If a group develops a critical
perspective of gender roles, Singer and Brant consider the organization feminista . If the
organization accepts gender roles, they consider it a femenina organization (Singer and
Brant 1982: 116).9 To determine if an organization is femenina or feminista, Singer and
Brant ask if it connects the interests it represents to a critique of gender roles. An
organization is not necessarily feminista because it prioritizes better child care: the
organization may politicize this issue because economic realities prevent its members from
remaining at home with their children rather than because they see child care as a necessary
step towards a transformation of gender roles. In this case, Brant and Singer argue that the
label femenina is more appropriate than feminista .
9 The definition provided by Singer and Brant could in fact be used to label some organizations associated
with the movimiento femenino as feminist organizations as well as defining some self-proclaimed feminists
as part of the movimiento femenino. While Singer's typology has greatly influenced how scholars interpret
the intentions of femenina versus feminista organizations, however, the label used to describe particular
groups is generally consistent with popular usage. Rather than stimulating a closer examination of the fit
between popularly labeled feminine or feminist organizations and Singer's definition of the qualities of each
type of group, one could argue that Singer's definition has often been used to attribute certain characteristics
to different types of women's organizations.
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Maxine Molyneux's distinction between strategic and practical interests bears many
similarities to the distinction between femenina and feminista. Practical gender interests
are "usually a response to an immediate perceived need, and they do not generally entail a
strategic goal such as women's emancipation or gender equality" (Molyneux 1985: 233).
An example of a practical gender interest is the material welfare of the family: women
mobilize around this practical gender interest when they participate in cost-of-living
movements, food riots, or popular economic organizations. Strategic gender interests, on
the other hand, develop from an "analysis of women's subordination": examples of
strategic interests are political equality for women, protection from violence against
women, and a more equitable distribution of childcare and domestic labor (Molyneux 1985:
233).
Though the two sets of distinctions evolved separately, many scholars use the terms
conjunctively. Sonia Alvarez connects the distinction made by Singer and Brant to the
types of interests described by Maxine Molyneux. She defines feminista organizations as
those that prioritize strategic interests, and femenina organizations as those that prioritize
practical interests.' 0 The strategic gender interests of feminista organizations challenge
women's traditional gender roles. Femenina organizations, by contrast, "mobilized to
defend their rights as wives and mother's, rights that the dominant ideology assures them
in theory, but that the dominant political and economic institutions deny them in practice"
(Alvarez, p.25). 1 I
10 Alvarez translates femenina to feminine in Engendering Democracy (1990) and in "Women's
Movements and Gender Politics in the Brazilian Transition" (1989). In a later work co-written with Nancy
Saporta Sternbach, Marysa Navarro-Aranguren and Patricia Chuchryk (1992), Alvarez uses the Spanish
terminology.
1 1Alvarez adds important elements to Maxine Molyneux and Singer's distinctions by emphasizing the fact
that it is not only poor women who organize around practical gender interests: middle class women also
organize around practical needs which do not necessarily challenge patterns of gender inequality. This is an
important contribution to a typology that is often used to categorize poor women's interests as practical and
middle-class women's interests as strategic without a close examination of the basis for those demands.
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While Alvarez links femenina organizations to the representation of practical
interests, she does not claim that femenina organizations are incapable of representing
strategic interests. Rather, she argues that in the Brazilian case femenina groups challenged
the unequal status of women, and worked in coalitions with feminista organizations.
Alvarez uses the categories of femenina and feminista throughout her analysis, but does not
dichotomize femenina and feminista interests: overlapping interests between femenina and
feminista organizations and the potential radicalization of women's organizations through
the political process are key elements in her explanation of the growth and strength of
women's movements in Brazil.
Femenina Organizations and Practical Interests
Theorists who draw on Alvarez's analysis of femenina organizations, however,
frequently argue that femenina organizations limit themselves to practical gender demands.
The connection between femenina organizations and practical interests is at the root of
arguments that claim that femenina organizations have limited potential to challenge gender
inequality. Carina Perelli's essay "Putting Conservatism to Good Use: Women and
Unorthodox Politics in Uruguay, from Breakdown to Transition" and Maruja Barrig's
"The Difficult Equilibrium Between Bread and Roses: Women's Organizations and the
Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy in Peru," argue that the emphasis on practical
rather than the strategic interests constrains the ability of femenina organizations to push for
significant change in gender roles.
Perelli argues that women's organizations in Uruguay were incapable of becoming
more than participants in a crisis mobilization because they focused too exclusively on their
immediate practical needs. Women's organizations that formed under the Uruguayan
dictatorship typically formed around a practical goal. The exclusive focus on particular,
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practical needs led to the formation of disparate women's organizations, which had short
life spans and limited impact beyond the immediate issues they addressed. The lack of
more broadly framed strategic interests between the various women's organizations was a
significant obstacle to the development of the kind of broad-based women's movements
necessary to promote wide-spread social and political change in the status of women: "Seen
from that angle, the groups were appallingly 'feminine.' The personal was political, but as
always happens when the personal and only the personal becomes political, they never saw
the forest because of the tree" (Perelli 1991:107).
Barrig criticizes femenina popular organizations in Peru for reifying barriers that
exclude women from traditional political channels.1 2 The dominance of day-to-day
practical gender interests in femenina popular organizations, as well as the absence of links
between practical interests and larger political issues, keeps women's struggles separate
from mainstream politics. Femenina organizations reinforce the sexual division of labor
by accepting the responsibility for obtaining practical needs, and by shunning standard
political tactics and strategies (such as alliances with political parties). Rather than bringing
women's organizations into mainstream politics, these tendencies accentuate "false
dichotomies: political power is man's discourse, and the domestic sphere and the quality of
life is women's concern, and traditionally undervalued" (Barrig 1991: 119).
Recent Critiques
Recent case studies studies, however, do not support the claim that femenina
organizations do not represent strategic gender interests. New studies document femenina
organizations which represent strategic gender interests in the course of their struggle to
12 Like Alvarez, Barrig translates femenina to feminine. Maria Del Carmen Feijo6 and Jane Jaquette who
make similar criticisms of femenina organizations also use the term "feminine."
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obtain practical gender needs such as clean water and sufficient food for their members'
families (Fisher 1993; Lind 1992; Schirmer 1988, 1993; Schild 1992; Stephen 1993a,
1993b, and forthcoming).' 3 These new studies also show that the degree to which an
organization represents strategic or practical gender interests fluctuates over time. Groups
which at one point in time reject the label feminist may embrace it at another. Groups
which prioritize the practical dimensions of their problems at a given point in time may
come to adopt a more strategic view under different political conditions.1 4
The new studies criticize the dichotomous tendencies of the literature on Latin
American women's organizations for obscuring complex realities. The claim that femenina
organization's only represent practical interests while feminista organizations represent
strategic gender interests presents a false dichotomy. It ignores the actual overlap between
the agendas of femenina and feminista organizations: both types of women's organizations
have politicized issues like day care, gender biases in land reform programs, and violence
against women. Furthermore, the rigid categories for women's organizations and their
interests ignores the actual changes within femenina organizations over time. Lynn Stephen
argues:
13 These studies consistently claim that the feminine/practical and feminist/strategic dichotomy is a false
dichotomy. Feminine and feminist identities and strategic and practical interests are not discreet, but
overlapping. Feminine and feminist identities frequently overlap within women's organizations. A
feminine organization, for example, may organize around traditional gender roles, but may adopt a critical
analysis of those roles within the organization: feminine organizations, for example, may have internal
discussions about the unequal division of household tasks (Stephen 1992: 5). Furthermore, organizations
may adopt a feminist analysis of some issues (such as violence against women) but not of other issues
(such as reproductive control or sexuality). Strategic interests and practical interests cannot be separated
consistently either. Many issues--such as childcare, divorce, and reproductive control--may be part of a
strategic agenda for feminists, but they are also practical day-to-day realities of many women (Craske 1993:
122). These kinds of interests can simultaneously be categorized as strategic and practical gender interests.
1 4 Recently, several works have emerged which provide a better foundation to examine the conditions under
which feminine organizations represent strategic gender interests on a political level. Yvonne Corocan-
Nantes argues that, "The transformation of practical gender interests into strategic gender interests requires
not only women's recognition of their power to represent their own interests but also that the space exists
within the prevailing political system to pressure the state into recognizing those interests" (Corocan-
Nantes: 144).
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While such dichotomies may provide convenient topologies for trying to classify
women's organizations at one point in time, they do not account for internal
contradictions within women's organizations, changes that take place over the life-
span of an organization in response to changing social and political circumstances,
and the transformative potential of organizations on women's individual political
perspectives. (Stephen 1992: 5)
The agendas of women's movements, like other social movements, are not immutable.
Movements politicize new issues from time to time, just as they abandon old ones. As
agendas change, women's movements frequently challenge the rigid boundaries of the
dichotomy framework: femenina organizations prioritize strategic gender interests without
suddenly proclaiming themselves a feminista organization, while feminista organizations
may eliminate some of the more strategically oriented gender interests in favor of practical
ones without renouncing feminism.
An alternative framework presents women's gender interests along a continuum,
with practical interests as one pole and strategic interests as the other. The continuum
framework anticipates overlap between the practical and the strategic, and a potential for
change over time. The usefulness of the continuum framework is evident in Jennifer
Schirmer's 1993 study of the CONAVIGUA widows of Guatemala and CO-MADRES of
El Salvador. Motherist and widowist groups politicize women's' traditional gender roles
of mothers and wives and defend their right to care for their families, and as such fall into
the category of femenina organizations. While these groups may not have organized
around violence against women initially, they confronted gender-specific threats of
violence on a daily basis as a result of their activism. Both CO-MADRES and
CONAVIGUA connected their "practical" problem to the larger strategic struggle to end
violence against women (Schirmer 1993: 61). The continuum framework allows overlap
between the practical survival strategies devised by CO-MADRES and CONAVIGUA. A
more static dichotomy framework would not be able to accommodate these kinds of
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overlaps or explain the transformation of practical survival strategies into strategic gender
interests.
Towards a New Analytical Framework
Though the flexibility of the continuum model is an appealing alternative to the
dichotomy model, it is difficult to use to map the transition of a group that organizes around
practical gender interests but gradually begins to represent a gender agenda that is at once
practical and strategic. One of the appealing aspects of the continuum model also makes it
difficult to use: the line between what is practical and what is strategic is not clearly define.
Clear definitions of strategic and practical gender interests are necessary in order to measure
the degree to which an organization represents those interests. Furthermore, the continuum
model seems to suggest that a group will move in one direction or the other (although
changing directions from time to time) rather than increasing or decreasing their activities
around both kinds of interests simultaneously.
I propose an alternative model that defines strategic and practical gender interests
clearly while not treating the two types of interests as mutually exclusive. The model is
two dimensional, with practical and strategic interests mapped along separate axes.
Strategic gender interests directly challenge barriers to gender equality (violence against
women, equitable pay, equal division of laboe within the home). Practical gender interests
are interests emanate from women's problems in their daily lives as they try to fulfill their
socially ascribed responsibilities (caring for their children, managing a household, feeding
their families). Interests can be strategic as well as practical: interests like day care may fill
the criteria for practical and strategic gender interests. Rather than trying to place interests
in two rigidly defined categories of analysis, I will explore the degree to which an interest
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the CO-MADRES represent fits either or both of the above definitions. At the same time, I
will measure the degree to which the CO-MADRES politically represent those interests.
The level of political activism (actions directed at political leaders and institutions) is the
variable I will use to measure the degree to which the CO-MADRES represent an interest
politically.
A two-dimensional conceptual graph visually represents the degree to which
women's organizations represent gender interests, as the graph below illustrates:
Gender Interests of
Women's Or2anizations
Strategic
orA
B
0
C
Practical
A) Women's advocacy groups: lobbying organizations which press for the elimination of
discrimination against women.
B) Women's support centers: agencies which provide assistance for women with specific problems
(organizations such as women's health clinics, shelters for battered women).
C) Women's neigborhood groups: groups in which women work collectively to satisfy material
needs for themselves and their families (projects that collectivize domestic tasks such as cooking or
childcare).
Women's advocacy groups that challenge legal barriers to gender equality represent
strategic gender interests to a high degree. I consider the interests they represent strategic
gender interests because they confront women's gendered subordination, and the degree to
which they politically represent those interests would be high because they address those
primarily, if not exclusively, through political channels. Women's support centers, on the
other hand, may represent both strategic and practical gender demands, but their agenda is
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less politicized than a woman's advocacy group. Women's health clinics, represent
practical interests by providing affordable pre-natal care for mothers who could not
otherwise afford medical care. They also represent strategic gender by providing
information about various forms of contraceptives that allow women to make key decisions
about whether and when to have children. Though a women's health clinic represents
practical and strategic gender interests by providing services, the degree to which they
politically represent those interests would depend on the level of political activity they
engage in to represent those interests. On the above chart, I am measuring the degree to
which a health clinic that occasionally becomes politically active around interests its group
represents: the group is not highly political active, but does represent interests politically.
Finally, a women's neighborhood group that provides women with basic material needs
represents practical gender interests. When such a group does not politicize their work I
would still consider them to represent practical gender interests, but the degree to which
they politically represent those interests is low.
A two-dimensional graph is particularly useful to illustrate change over time. Over
time, a group may go from low levels of political activity to higher levels, or vice versa.
The graph below illustrates the changing degree of strategic and practical gender interests of
a hypothetical women's organization:
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Gender Interests of a
Women'sOrganization
Strategic
a bc
a b
Practical
The above illustration charts the development of a women's organization as it politicizes it
practical agenda, from point a to point b, and then gradually politicizes more strategic
interests (between point b and c). An advantage of the two-dimensional representation of
women's gender interests is that it does not present strategic and practical gender interests
as competing: the illustration above shows a simultaneous increase in the politicization of
practical and strategic gender interests.
The new framework is more useful to describe the kinds of interests that femenina
organizations typically represent than a dichotomy model: many of the interests they
represent are difficult to categorize as purely strategic or practical. At the same time, the
framework is more useful than a continuum, because it provides a clearer definition of
practical and strategic gender interests. Finally, this model is more useful to my project
than either of the competing frameworks because it provides the means to measure the
degree to which a group represents those interests politically.
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Chapter Two: Changing Interests and Political Representation
Much of the emerging alternative literature focuses on the internal dynamics of
femenina organizations to illustrate the degree to which they represent strategic gender
interests. The analyses focus on the transformative potential of political organization: how
participation in political organizations builds self-esteem, develops political skills, and
raises consciousness. These skills are vital to the on-going political participation of the
women active in these organizations. In this sense, femenina organizations challenge the
political marginalization of women. Women who participate in neighborhood organizations
cite their lack of understanding of the connections between politics and their lives as the key
reason they did not participate in politics previously. Overcoming lack of knowledge
about political things is a significant hurdle toward inclusion in political life.
With a few notable exceptions, the new theories neglect examination of the external
factors that facilitate or impede the representation of different kinds of interests. Political
allies may or may not provide assistance (through material resources as well as political
support) to femenina organizations when they attempt to represent gender interests. The
degree to which political alliances constrain or facilitate the representation of strategic
gender interests is frequently left unexplored.
Social movement theory, on the other hand, explores the relationship between
movement organizations and the political environment more thoroughly. Three schools
make significant contributions: new social movement theories, resource mobilization
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theories, and political process theories. While new social movement theories and resource
mobilization theories highlight the potential role of allies in facilitating or constraining the
representation of movement interests, the political process model provides the strongest
analytical tools for explaining the relationship between movements and macro-political
conditions.
New Social Movements Theory
West European scholars were primarily responsible for the development of new
social movement theory. They began to develop it in order to explain the emergence of
movements such as the environmental movement, the student movement, the women's
movement, and the gay rights movement in the second half of the twentieth century.
Because many ot these scholars came from a Marxist academic background, the key
problematic was explaining why these "new" movements were not class-based (Munck
1990: 24).
A central project of new social movement theory is to explain the relationship
between the construction of identity and collective interests. Melucci defines collective
identity as: "Nothing else than a shared definition of the field of opportunities to collective
action: 'shared' means constructed and negotiated through a repeated process of 'activation'
of social relationships connecting the actors" (Melucci 1986: p. 793). New social
movement theorists securely link collective identity and the interests an organization
represents. An organization must have some sense of purpose--some type of collective
identity--that defines collective interests and the priority of those interests (Pizzorno
1985:50). What costs are acceptable as social movements represent their interests cannot be
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determined without reference to the a collectivity's sense of purpose (Melucci 1988: 343;
Munck 1990; 24-25).1 5
Although the focus in the new social movement theory is primarily on the internal
dynamics of identity, some theorists explore the role the external environment plays in
defining those interests. Though identity may provide the lens through which social
movement organizations understand their environment, movements nonetheless respond to
external stimulus, constraints, and opportunities. Collective interests reflect a movement's
interpretation of those external conditions: the process of defining interests, while internal
to the organization, responds to its particular context.
New social movement theorists often concentrate on the problematic aspects of the
relationship between social movements and their environment: the emphasis tends to fall
more often on the constraints of the external environment than the opportunities it offers. A
theme that dominates new social movement literature is the question of autonomy versus
co-optation. New social movement theorists consider autonomy necessary to the ability of
organizations to make key decisions (to define interests, establish priorities, draw limits on
the negotiability of certain issues) without undue pressure from allies. A co-opted
organization's dependence on allies constrains its capacity to define goals and priorities.
Social movement organizations that politically represent their agenda engage in a precarious
balancing act: while they may not want to be co-opted by more powerful allies, they need
the support of those allies to successfully represent their interests (Garreton 1986; 1989;
Touraine 1988). The process frequently leads to internal conflicts and on occasion, the
150ne key issue raised by many new social movement theorists is that collective actors may at times
consider certain interests to be non-negotiable (Mainwaring and Viola 1984; Munck 1990; Offe 1985;
Touraine 1988). Social movement activists "often consider their central concern of such high and universal
priority that no part of it can be meaningfully sacrificed...without negating the concern itself" (Offe 1985:
830). While what is negotiable and what is not may change over time, it is necessary to recognize that
there are frequently internal constraints on strategic decision making.
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weakening or breakdown of movements and movement organizations (Mainwaring and
Viola 1984: 53).
Though the issues of autonomy and co-optation merit investigation, much of the
discussion romanticizes autonomy. Judith Alder Hellman calls this phenomenon "the
fetishism of autonomy" (Hellman 1992: 54). Because scholars who study movements
often have a strong preference for autonomy, they tend to conflate many types of
relationships with elites or parties as "co-optation." This analysis masks the real gains
organizations may be making, as well as denying that a group whose actions may now be
more constrained has preserved even a limited degree of autonomy. Although the
discussion of autonomy adds an important dimension to any analysis of social movement
organizations' relationships with allies, the absence of adequate analysis of the beneficial
aspects of alliances creates a distorted picture of that relationship.
Resource Mobilization Theories
Resource mobilization theory, on the other hand, focuses on questions of strategy
and explores the positive elements of a social movement organization's interaction with the
external environment more extensively. The U.S. based resource mobilization school
developed in response to social-psychological analysis of social movement actors that
treated the movements as irrational (Cohen 1985: 673).1 6 One of the main departures of
resource mobilization from social-psychological theory is the argument that social
movement activists are rational actors (Ferree 1992: 29). Movement activists are able to
make calculated cost-benefit analysis decisions based on the external constraints and
1 6 Until the 1970's, the social psychological paradigm dominated US studies of collective behavior. Within
this paradigm, mass-society theory and Smelser's structural fimctionalist model of collective behavior have
been singled out for criticism by resource mobilization theorists for their treatment of social movements as
irrational, spontaneous phenomena (Cohen 1985:673).
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opportunities present.1 7 Through strategic choices, social movement actors are able to
acquire resources and make strategic alliances in order to represent their interests.
While new social movement theorists at times seem to exaggerate the dilemma of
autonomy versus co-optation, resource mobilization theories treat alliances as simply
another strategic choice. Allies are a source of political support and material resources.
Establishing alliances may require some trade-offs or compromises, but social movement
organizations are capable of making those kinds of strategic choices through a rational
decision-making process. In resource mobilization, the definition of rationality is a
narrowly instrumental one: organizations demonstrate rational behavior when they make
strategic choices that help them attain their goals (Gamson and Fireman 1979). Strategic
alliances are judged by their utility to attaining movement goals. Dependence on allies is
not necessarily a problem if collective goals are being attained.
The instrumental conception of collective logic that underlies resource mobilization
leads to an understatement of the problematic nature of the relationship with allies. The
instrumental logic within resource mobilization theory leads to an emphasis on how
organizations represent their interests rather than how they define their objectives.
Resource mobilization theories do not generally give adequate treatment to the potential
drawback of a strategic alliance because they focus more on the capacity of movements to
1 7 An example of a resource mobilization approach to explaining strategic choices of social movement
organizations is offered in Jo Freeman's "Resource Mobilization and Strategy: A Model for Analyzing
Social Movement Organization Actions." Freeman attempts to develop a structuralist analysis which
"would look at the confines within which a movement's strategy develops, the resources it can realistically
mobilize, the limits on the uses of these resources, and the environment that molds the possibilities for
effective action" (Freeman 1979: 168). The model she develops has four components: "mobilizable
resources, constraints on those resources, SMO Isocial movement organization] structure and internal
environment, and expectations about potential targets" (Freeman 1979: 170). Each of these components
shapes movement strategy through the obstacles and opportunities it presents. An organization whose
resources include access to the media and to legislators has different opportunities for strategy than a group
which has little or no access to traditional media or policy makers. While some organizations are structured
hierarchically and decisions flow from the top down, others are loosely structured and do not have a clear
chain of command: the kind of strategies each organization can effectively carry out will be determined at
least in part by the degree of centralization. Finally, how an organization perceives its "reference publics"
(Lipsky 1970: 2) or targets of influence will shape what they believe will be an effective strategy.
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fulfill their objectives than on their capacity to set their agenda independently. If an
organization is so dependent on an ally that they cannot articulate specific interests, the
relationship is indeed problematic.
An additional weakness of much of the resource mobilization literature is its
inattentiveness to the constraints political systems impose on the range of strategic choice.
Perhaps because the majority of resource mobilization theorists are North American and
study North American movements, liberal democratic norms are often assumed. Theories
do not explore how the process of building "resources" such as elite support, money,
media coverage, or alliances with other movements and organizations would be affected by
a different type of regime. The presence or absence of an open democratic political system
and guarantees of rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom
of association surely change the range of strategic choices available to movements. Even
within a democratic system, however, changes in the political climate may affect the
capacity of an organization to represent certain interests, and merits thorough inquiry.
The Political Process Model
The political process model, an offshoot of resource mobilization, explores the
extent to which political conditions shape the range of strategies available to movement
organizations. The works of Eisinger (1973), Tilly and Rule (1975), Jenkins and Perrow
(1977), and McAdam (1982), provide the foundation for the political process model. In
contrast to much resource mobilization literature, these works treat external political
conditions as a source of substantial constraints and opportunities for movements and
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organizations. Those conditions change over time, and different political opportunity
structures emerge. Social movement organizations may be able to articulate interests under
certain conditions and not under others.
Though there are variations in the details of political process models, the basic tenet
is that the political context directly effects the development of political movements. In The
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, McAdam argues:
First, in contrast to the various classical formulations, a social movement is held to
be above all, a political rather than a psychological phenomenon. That is, factors
shaping institutionalized political processes are argued to be of equal analytical
utility in accounting for social insurgency. Second, a movement represents a
continuous process from generation to decline, rather than a discrete series of
developmental stages. Accordingly, any complete model of social insurgency
should offer the researcher a framework for analyzing the entire process of
movement development rather than a particular phase (e.g. the emergence of social
protest) of that same process.
(McAdam 1982: 36)
McAdam considers social movements to be political phenomena, that are effected by the
same dynamics that shape the actions of more conventional actors. s8 Movement's define
objectives and strategies within the constraints and opportunities the political context
establishes.' 9 The political process model explicitly engages the question resource
mobilization fails to address: how changes within the political system affect movement
actions.
18 As Sidney Tarrow argues "If collective action is a form of politics, then as in conventional politics,
there must be a set of constraints and opportunities that encourage or discourage this kind of behavior and
lead it towards certain forms rather than others" (Tarrow 1991: 32).
19 The key difference between the political behavior of social movement organizations and more
conventional actors stems from the position of social movement activists as outsiders or "challengers" to
the political system. Because of their position as outsiders, "Movement organizations do not simply prefer
collective action to institutional politics: they use it because it is only in the interaction between
themselves and their mobilization potential that they can prove themselves and attract a following,
challenging opponents and impressing authorities with their prowess." (Tarrow 1991: 38). Because of their
position as outsiders, movement activists have to attract the attention and the assistance of insiders in order
to influence policy outcomes. This is similar to a point Alain Touraine raises in Return of the Actor: he
argues that while social movements can provide the stimulus for political change, they do not often control
the direction of change because they are excluded from the decision-making process.
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McAdam's political process model signals four determinants of the generation and
development of a movement. He argues:
It is the confluence of expanding political opportunities, indigenous organizational
strength, and the presence of certain shared cognitions within the minority
community that is held to facilitate movement emergence. Over time these factors
continue to shape the development of insurgency in combination with a fourth
factor: the shifting control response of other groups to the movement"
(McAdam 1982: 59).
Political opportunities, organizational strength and collective consciousness fluctuate over
time. As movements emerge, social control responses frequently develop as well.
McAdam's model presents a dynamic relationship between the external environment and
movements: while external constraints are at least partially determinative of movement
development, movements have the potential to change the external environment (McAdam
1982: 56).
One of the weaknesses of the political process model, however, is the vagueness of
the definition of "the structure of political opportunities." In the original use of the term,
Peter Eisinger provides the following definition:
The elements of the [political] context are conceived of as components of the
particular structure ofpolitical opportunities of a community. That is to say, such
factors as the nature of the chief executive, the mode of aldermanic election, the
distribution of social skills and status, the degree of social disintegration, taken
individually or collectively, serve in various ways to obstruct or facilitate citizen
activity in pursuit of political goals. Other environmental factors, such as the
climate of government responsiveness and the level of community resources, help
establish the chances of success of citizen political activity. In short, elements in
the environment impose certain constraints on political activity or open avenues for
it.
(Eisinger 1973: 11-12)
The definition Eisinger provides is quite broad: the range of components that make up the
political environment seems nearly infinite. The definition also does not clarify whether
political opportunities must be perceived as such in order to affect movement development.
Sidney Tarrow argues that, "Scholars have not been clear on whether they regard political
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opportunities as objective or subjective factors: the term structure usually refers to forces
that operate independent of actor's consciousness; but if collective action is strategic,
doesn't a political opportunity have to be perceived in order to affect an actor's behavior?"
(Tarrow 1991:39). Although the political process model offers useful insights, the term
"political opportunity" needs further clarification.
Femenina Organizations, Gender Interests and the Political Process
The political process model, although imperfect, provides the best framework to
understand the relationship between external political conditions and the range of strategies
available to femenina organizations as they represent their interests. New social movement
theories highlight the question of autonomy, but do not adequately explore the degree to
which allies help social movement organizations represent collective interests. Resource
mobilization theories present alliances as potentially beneficial to social movement
organizations, but do not explore the extent to which dependence on allies may constrain
the ability of organizations to represent certain interests. The political process model
allows for an interpretation of strategic alliances that includes their potential to constrain and
facilitate interest representation. The degree to which allies constrain or facilitate interest
representation depends on the particular structure of political opportunities at a given point
in time.
A clear definition of political opportunity structure is necessary to use the political
process model effectively. Sidney Tarrow provides a sufficiently clear definition. He
separates the concept into four components: "The degree of openness or closure of the
polity; the stability or instability of political alignments; the presence or absence of allies
and support groups; and divisions within the elite or its tolerance or intolerance of protest."
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(Tarrow 1991: 34). I will explore the responsiveness of government officials to
opposition demands, the use of repression against the opposition, and the level and nature
of opposition organization.
Each of the factors is a potential source of constraints on the range of strategies
available to social movement organizations, as well as a source of opportunities. The
degree to which the government responds to the opposition determines which strategies are
likely to be effective. The degree to which a government uses repressive mechanisms may
make certain strategic choices more costly to the organization at some points than at others.
Finally, the strength and degree of dependence of the opposition determine the degree to
which allies can support or limit the agendas of opposition organizations. These three
factors produce conditions under which an organization may be more or less able to
represent certain interests: some strategies may be more viable or more costly at different
points in time, and the organizations may be more or less dependent on allies as the range
of strategies and potential allies changes over time. Although an organization must
ultimately choose whether or not they will represent certain interests at one point rather than
another, and may in fact perceive constraints and opportunities differently, their capacity to
do so may be judged based on an objective assessment of these factors.
Chapter Three: Genesis of a Femenina Organization, 1977-1981
CO-MADRES began as a group of nine Salvadoran women in December 1977. In
spite of their initial small size, their influence in the political arena expanded rapidly. The
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CO-MADRES efficacy in the late seventies is attributable to innovative extra-institutional
tactics and alliances with the Church and other opposition organizations. After 1980,
however, increasing repression limited the range of viable public opposition and weakened
many of the CO-MADRES allies. As the costs of open protest escalated and strategic
alliances with other opposition organizations became less viable means of representing their
interests, the CO-MADRES carried out fewer public activities and developed ties
internationally.
The CO-MADRES entered the political arena to represent a practical gender interest: the
right to care for and protect their children and family members. The support of the Church
and opposition organizations was critical to the CO-MADRES ability to politicize these
maternal rights, as well as to their capacity to politicize a broad human rights agenda. The
CO-MADRES also discussed strategic gender interests to some extent: they discussed
problems such as domestic violence and developed tactics to help individual members
escape abuse. The CO-MADRES generally confronted domestic violence when it became a
problem for an individual member and their tactics generally relied on social pressure rather
than political action. Although the CO-MADRES worked on solutions to problems caused
by domestic violence and other barriers to women's equal participation in politics during
this period, they did not politicize these strategic gender interests. The CO-MADRES
depended on the support of the Church and the organized opposition in order to politically
represent their practical gender interests, but those allies did not provide the same political
or material support for strategic gender interests.
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The Political Context
When the CO-MADRES voiced their first political demands, they encountered an
exclusive and repressive political elite.2 0 Although progressive elites instituted some
reforms under the civilian-military juntas of the late seventies and early eighties, hardliners
in the junta escalated violent repression against the opposition. As repression increased and
clandestine activities and guerrilla warfare became the only channels for opposition groups,
the FMLN-FDR began to consolidate control over the opposition.
Regime Responsiveness and Repression, 1977-1981
A political system crisis developed in the seventies as opposition to political repression
and economic inequality grew stronger. In the sixties and seventies, priests and nuns
influenced by liberation theology began organizing peasants in the countryside (Berryman
1984: 98-106; Montgomery 70-76). At the same time, urban organizations gained
strength. Although some opposition groups were strictly non-violent, others, such as the
Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), founded in 1970, advocated armed insurrection.
Powerful sectors of the elite and the military promoted greater repression in response to
the growth of the opposition. In 1977, the Salvadoran government was run by the military
through President Carlos Humberto Romero. The Romero government took a hard line
against the opposition and politically motivated violence escalated during his term
(America's Watch 1991: 6). In addition to coersion carried out directly by the military,
2 0 The historically exclusive nature of El Salvador's political system is illustrated by the common reference
to "los catorce," meaning the fourteen families that dominate El Salvador's political system and its
economy. More than fourteen families make up the oligarchic elite, but the reference captures the distortion
of power relations.
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paramilitary units connected to the wealthy landowners and the military (known as the
death squads) conducted campaigns against the opposition and the progressive church.
Progressive officers, on the other hand, advocated moderate reform to mitigate the
growth of the guerrilla forces (America's Watch 1991: 7). Younger officers with reformist
inclinations received positive signals from the U.S. and orchestrated a coup d'6tat on
October 15, 1979 (Arnson 1982: 39). The new junta endeavored to create a moderately
progressive regime with joint governance of civilians and military officials. The first junta,
led by Colonels Majano and Gutierrez, included progressive elites such as Guillermo Ungo
of the social democratic National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), and Ruben Zamora and
Hector Dada of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Salvador Samoya (then a professor
of philosophy), and Rom•an Mayorga Quir6z, rector of the Jesuit university (Armstrong
and Shenk 1982: 117-121; North 1985: 81).
Although the Democratic revolutionary junta aspired to reform El Salvador's political
system, obstacles to reform were numerous. Military hardliners continued to occupy key
positions and vetoed reform programs they percieved to be radical. The Democratic
revolutionary junta initiated some reformes, but they were limited in scope and were often
not fully implemented. Frustrated by the constraints imposed on their power to implement
reforms, five progressive civilian officials resigned on December 29, 1979 (Armstrong and
Shenk 1982: 129). Hect6r Dada and Ruben Zamora remained and became part of the
second junta. Early in 1980, Dada and Zamora resigned as well. Jose Napole6n Duarte
returned from exile to become the civilian head of the third junta on March 5, 1980 (North
1985: 83).2"
Between 1980 and 1981, repression reached a new apex. The new junta declared a state
of emergency on March 6. the day after Duarte took office, suspending freedom of
21 Duarte, who ran for president in 1972 on an opposition ticket, had fled the country after being tortured
and receiving death threats.
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movement, assembly, and expression (America's Watch 1991: 143). The assasination of
Archbishop Romero occurred just three weeks after the new junta ascended to power. on
March 24, 1980. Four North American churchwomen were raped and killed by the
National Guard on December 2, 1980 (Americas Watch 1991: 144). Military and
paramilitary units arrested, tortured, and killed political activists. Between March 1980 and
March 1982, an estimated 25,000 civilians were killed in political violence (Popkin 1991:
60).
Development of the Opposition, 1977-1981
Under Archbishop Romero, the Salvadoran Church became an outspoken advocate for
human rights. Liberation theology heavily influenced the Salvadoran Church theology.
Between 1968 and 1977, priests and nuns established hundreds of Christian Base
Communities. Priests and nuns became especially active in organizing the poor in rural
areas (Montgomery 1983: 79). The activism of the Church incited great hostility within
members of the landed elite and the military. As early as May 1977 fliers with the slogan
"Be a Patriot! Kill a Priest" were circulated in San Salvador (Montgomery 1983: 80). The
threats were not idle and death squads assassinated a number of priests. Archbishop
Romero responded to the attacks on the Church by condemning the attackers rather than the
work of activist priests. He condemned human rights abuses in masses that were broadcast
throughout the country on the church radio station, YSAX (Montgomery 1983: 79). He
established a legal aid office to help victims and family members of victims called the
Socorro Juridico. Romero also provided moral and material support to human rights
organizations, including the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission (CDHES).
Though Romero promoted a path of non-violent resistance, other opposition activists
turned increasingly to violent insurrection. By the end of the seventies, there were five
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main guerrilla organizations, known as the revolutionary parties: the Communist Party of
El Salvador. or PCS; the Popular Liberation Forces, or FPL; the People's Revolutionary
Army, or ERP; the Armed Forces of Resistance, or FARN; and the Central American
Revolutionary Workers Party, or PRTC. These revolutionary parties advocated radical
changes in the Salvadoran political and economic system and promoted armed insurrection
as the path to a transformed society.
Social organizations developed close ties with the revolutionary parties. The
revolutionary parties created a number of social organizations in order to mobilize particular
sectors of the Salvadoran public. For example, the FPL founded the Women's
Association of El Salvador (AMES). AMES central objective was the integration of
women, especially poor, urban women, into the struggle for "national liberation" (Golden
1991: 110).2 2 Existing social organizations strengthened ties to the revolutionary parties.
The United Popular Action Front, an umbrella organization of peasants, urban workers,
teachers and students, established an alliance with the FARN. The Popular Revolutionary
Block (BPR) united labor unions and peasant organizations affiliated with the FPL. The
Popular Leagues 28th of February (LP-28) and the Popular Liberation Movement (MLP)
affiliated with the ERP and the PRTC respectively (North 1985: 77).
As repression escalated in the early eighties, social organizations and left-wing political
parties untied in a series of coalitions. The BPR, LP-28, FAPU and the Nationalist
Democratic Union (UDN--a progressive political party) first formed the Movement for
Popular Unity, and then became part of the Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses in
1980. Finally, popular organization and opposition parties came together in the FDR in
April 1980. The FDR united the MNR and the MPSC (the Popular Social Christian
22 Although I focus here on the case of AMES, other women's organizations were formed by revolutionary
parties and worked closely with the FMLN. The Association of Progressive women of El Salvador was
formed in 1975 by the Communist party, and three other organizations were formed by the other three
revolutionary parties in the early eighties. The five women's organizations joined together in the Union of
Salvadoran Women for Liberation "Melida Anaya Montes" (UMS).
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Movement, a splinter group of the PDC), the popular organizations of the Revolutionary
Coordination of the Masses, and the political arms of the revolutionary forces under the
Politico-Diplomatic Commission (Radu 1985: 682). The five main guerrilla forces formed
a unified directorate coordinated by the leaders of each faction, known as the FMLN after
November 1980 (Radu 1985: 675; Waller 1991: 15). The FDR and the FMLN established
a formal alliance to coordinate activities of the armed and unarmed opposition.
The FMLN-FDR consolidated its influence within the opposition. Religious activists
continued to be persecuted, as were labor union leaders, human rights activists, and student
organizers. Some organizations were destroyed while others were forced underground.
Under the leadership of Archbishop Rivera y Damas (Romero's successor), the Church
hierarchy was more reticent to confront the junta or openly support opposition activities
(Berryman 1984: 155-58). Many organizations could continue their work only with the
clandestine help of the guerrilla forces. At the same time, persecuted activists began to
perceive armed insurrection as the only viable means of opposition. Disillusioned members
of the first and second juntas, such as Ruben Zamora, RomAn Mayorga, and Guillermo
Ungo joined the FDR after their resignations (Armstrong and Shenk 1982: 153).
Constraints and Opportunities: The Development of CO-MADRES, 1977-1981
The external political environment provided both constraints and opportunities for the
CO-MADRES. The lack of institutional mechanisms to hold the government accountable
prompted the CO-MADRES to develop innovative extra-institutional tactics to effectively
voice their demands. Severe repression, however, constrained their ability to publicly
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oppose the government. The Catholic Church provided critical resources and support for
the CO-MADRES, but could not completely protect them from government sponsored
violence. After the death of Archbishop Romero, the Church continued to provide certain
key resources, but it backed away from its previous advocacy role. The loss of their patron
and the increasing repression deeply affected the CO-MADRES, and by the early eighties
their activities were less visible.
Regime Responsiveness, Repression and the Tactical Development of CO-MADRES
The CO-MADRES encountered difficulties representing their demands through
institutional channels to government officials. The CO-MADRES drafted a letter to then
President Romero four days after they held their first meeting. The letter gave the names of
twenty-one of the detained-disappeared, and demanded that these relatives be returned.
President Romero did not respond (Schirmer 1993: 32). One CO-MADRE described the
failure of their legal tactics: "We tried to legally petition the Minister of Justice and the
President, but we were told, 'Women, your relatives are in such-and-such a place [outside
the country]. Or they would tell us, 'Your son is fighting in the mountains as a guerrilla"'
(Schirmer 1993: 40). The CO-MADRES repeatedly failed to find information about their
children or secure their release through these formal channels.
The CO-MADRES resorted to extra-institutional tactics out of frustration. In a 1988
testimonial, Miriam talks about the CO-MADRES decision to use extra-institutional tactics:
At first, we would just go to the barracks and police stations to inquire about the
victims. Since that didn't work, we realized that we had to make the largest number
of people find out in the shortest amount of time that someone has been captured.
If a kidnapping is publicized immediately, the person has a better chance of
survival. So little by little, we realized that we had to be more active and visible.
That was when we started taking our public spaces, like churches or government
offices. The point of these actions was not only to take the place in a non-violent
way but to make sure that it was full of people, especially children. This way they
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became our "hostages," and through them we acquired some strength to make the
government hear our voices. (Acosta 1993: 135)
Another CO-MADRE provided a similar testimony for Jennifer Schirmer: "But these legal
actions didn't evoke any response, so we thought about public marches in the streets two
or three times a week and sitting on the steps of the cathedral and in the market places"
(Schirmer 1993: 40). Early in their development, they denounced the government
publicly, through marches, occupations of public spaces, and paid advertisements in
Salvadoran newspapers such as El Diario de Hoy, La Prensa Grafica, and Diario Latino
(Tula 1993).
Government repression, however, constrained the ability of the CO-MADRES to use
extra-institutionalized tactics. As repression increased through 1980 and 1981, marches
became more dangerous. The military sometimes attacked marches directly, but frequently
picked up demonstrators in the days after the march. The newspapers began to refuse to
print the CO-MADRES advertisements (Tula 1993). In 1978, the CO-MADRES received
their first death threat in a letter, and they continued to receive threats from then on.2' 3 A
bomb exploded in their first office in 1980, and another bombing occurred in 1981.
The CO-MADRES created innovative tactics to balance their need to voice their demands
and the need to avoid regime retaliation. They developed clandestine tactics to spread their
message. In one instance, they put notices in egg crates which they then sold in the
marketplace (Acosta 1993: 136). They visited factories and schools, asking for donations
of food and clothing for the political prisoners. The CO-MADRES found that this tactic
proved effective in increasing awareness about the political prisoners as well as in gathering
the necessary supplies (Acosta 1993: 136). Though political conditions of El Salvador at
23 One of the more public threats was made by Robert D'Aubisson, mayor of San Salvador and head of the
death squads: he threatened to decapitate every one of the CO-MADRES (Schirmer 1993: 39; Sentir Con El
Pueblo 1993).
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the time forced the CO-MADRES to voice their demands through extra-institutional,
clandestine channels the CO-MADRES continued to voice their opposition to the regimes
abuse of human rights by using creative, adaptable tactics.
The Role of Allies
The support of allies, especially the Catholic Church, was critical to the CO-MADRES.
The Church was the most outspoken and dependable ally until the assassination of
Archbishop Romero, and provided CO-MADRES with much needed material resources as
well as political support. Until the repression of 1980-81, opposition organizations also
provided valuable political support. After the assassination of Romero and the assault on
the urban opposition, however, relying on domestic allies a became less viable tactic.
After 1980, the CO-MADRES increasingly channeled their demands through international
allies.
Archbishop Romero and the progressive sectors of the church provided important moral
support for the CO-MADRES. Romero was personally involved with the group, and met
with them to receive updates on their work and offer moral support (Tula 1993; Stephen
Forthcoming: 117). The Archbishop gave the CO-MADRES access to the Church run
radio station, YSAX, to issue their denunciations, and provided some financial support for
the CO-MADRES (Tula 1993). CO-MADRES worked closely with the two other church
sponsored human right organizations, the non-governmental Human Rights Commission
(CDHES) and Socorro Juridico: both organizations provided legal assistance and helped
with the documentation of human rights violations.
Labor unions and popular organizations also became important allies. The CO-
MADRES work on specific human rights cases involving union members and political
activists, such as the capture of the leaders of the Electrical Workers Union in 1980, earned
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the political support of unions and social organizations (Tula 1993). FENESTRAS (the
National Federation of Salvadoran Workers), in particular, supported the CO-MADRES by
appearing in solidarity at CO-MADRES' demonstrations and occasionally donating material
support (Tula 1993).
The CO-MADRES also developed relationships with political leaders and organizations
outside El Salvador during this period, as well as with international human rights
organizations. In 1978, CO-MADRES was invited to the World Conference of Peace in
Costa Rica because of the publicity their work had received (Stephen Forthcoming: 128).
While there, they met with Costa Rican organizations to encourage solidarity. They also
began to work with FEDEFAM, a Latin American federation of human rights organizations
(specifically of groups of relatives of victims) after meeting with other Latin American
human rights activists at the conference (Tula 1993).
The CO-MADRES called on their allies in order to pressure the government to respond
to their demands. The occupation of the Red Cross, for example, became a vehicle to call
on their allies for support. Maria described the occupation of the Red Cross: "Ten mothers
entered the Red Cross and stood by the door. We told the people inside that this would be
a peaceful taking and that they would not be allowed to leave until the government heard
our demands. Another group stood outside the Red Cross and denounced the violation of
human rights" (Tula 1993). As an international organization charged with neutrality in
protecting the rights of all peoples, the Red Cross was an ideal site to attract international
and domestic attention to their demands and at the same time to protect the CO-MADRES
from immediate retaliation. As the word spread, their allies began to pressure the
government. The Archbishop responded to the occupation of the Red Cross by praising
the courage of the mothers in his homilies, and trade unions showed solidarity with CO-
MADRES (Stephen Forthcoming: 123). The political prisoners of all the jails announced a
hunger strike in solidarity with the CO-MADRES.
43
By 1980-81, appealing to domestic allies became a less feasible tactic. Although
Rivera y Damas continued to support the CO-MADRES by allowing them access to the
Church radio station and quietly confronting the military when they made it too dangerous
for the CO-MADRES to work in the Archdiocese, he was never the outspoken champion
of human rights that Romero had been. Many social organizations were struggling to
survive due to government repression. FMLN activity was increasing, but open ties to the
FMLN would have subjugated the CO-MADRES to even more military repression, and
would have jeopardized their relationship with international human rights activists.
In the absence of other tactical choices, the CO-MADRES enlisted help from various
embassies. The CO-MADRES distributed packets of denunciations of human rights
abuses on a bimonthly basis. While they occasionally chose not to visit the embassies
because the danger was too great (the embassies were observed by the military) they
continued to distribute the packets even during the height of repression after 1980-81.
Some embassies, such as the Mexican embassy, assisted the CO-MADRES by denouncing
human rights violations and providing visas for the CO-MADRES. Others, like the U.S.
embassy refused to acknowledge the validity of the CO-MADRES charges of human rights
violations and denied visas to the CO-MADRES (Tula 1993).2 4
Human Rights and Gender Interests from 1977-1982
The variation in the types of gender interests the CO-MADRES represent and the degree
to which they politicize specific interests reflects the range of opportunities within the
2 4 While the embassy was somewhat responsive to the general issue of human rights when Robert White
was ambassador under the Carter administration, it became increasingly hostile under the Reagan appointee,
Deane Hinton (Americas Watch 1991:121)
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particular political context. Initially, the CO-MADRES politicized a practical gender
agenda: they confronted the state as mothers who were trying to fulfill their traditional role
and care for their children. Archbishop Romero and numerous opposition organizations
provided vital political and material support that enabled the CO-MADRES to politicize their
practical gender agenda. At the same time the CO-MADRES confronted some issues that
would be considered strategic gender interests, such as domestic violence. Although the
CO-MADRES were able to address strategic gender interests within their community
without substantial support from their allies, they did not politicize those interests. There
were fewer political opportunities to politicize strategic gender agenda during this period.
Ultimately, even the space available to represent practical gender interests contracted, and
the CO-MADRES public activity around practical gender interests declined.
The CO-MADRES began as a group of mothers who were searching for their own
children, but soon politicized a broader practical gender agenda. Initially, they politicized
their own particular practical gender interests by confronting the state and demanding their
children be returned. The CO-MADRES soon expanded the range of practical interests
they represented beyond demands that their own children be returned: they began to extend
their demands on the state to include an end to all violations of human rights, not just the
ones that effected their children. The role of motherhood was still important in the CO-
MADRES interpretation of their collective purpose. Miriam, a member of the CO-
MADRES since 1979, offered this interpretation of the CO-MADRES work: "We are the
mothers of the people. We started looking for our children and loved ones, and now we do
for others what they cannot do for themselves." (Acosta 1993: 132). The importance of
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their status as mothers transcends their own family, and becomes a symbolic motherhood
of all those who suffered under government repression.2 5
Archbishop Romero provided vital support to the CO-MADRES efforts to represent
their practical gender interests. Romero was a key figure in mobilizing the CO-MADRES,
and it would be difficult to overstate his influence on the organization in its formative years.
He was instrumental in creating the organization, and continued to meet with the CO-
MADRES frequently until his assassination. The CO-MADRES maternal role was central
to his vision of the organization's purpose. He preached to the CO-MADRES about the
interest they had as mothers in caring for their children, and the special pain mother's feel
upon losing a child.2 6 He suggested the organization be formed in order to alleviate that
pain and represent their maternal interest: he told them to "abandon their separate struggles
and unite forces in a single voice by forming a single organization" (Sentir Con El Pueblo
1993: 2). In weekly meetings with the CO-MADRES, he counseled them to speak for the
rights of all the mother against the violence that caused their common suffering (Tula
1993).
Romero offered more than moral support to the CO-MADRES as they pursued their
practical agenda. The resources he provided, including the access to the Church radio
station, YSAX, and financing of newspaper ads, were instrumental to the CO-MADRES
ability to publicize their practical gender interests. His weekly masses, in which he praised
the CO-MADRES and publicly supported their demands, provided another important
source of publicity for the CO-MADRES' practical gender interests.
Student organizations, trade unions, and other social organizations also supported the
politicization of the CO-MADRES practical gender interests. These organizations
2 5 Anothe r manifestation of the expanded interepretation of motherhood was the CO-MADRES projects: the
CO-MADRES organized projects to care for their family members in prison and for the families of the
victims.
2 6 A common analogy he offered was between the pain of the Virgin Mary when Christ was taken and the
pain of Salvadoran mothers (Tula 1993).
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participated in marches the CO-MADRES organized to demand the return of their children.
They showed support by their presence outside buildings the CO-MADRES occupied to
pressure the government to release their children and other political prisoners. Finally,
humanitarian organizations, such as the Red and Green Cross, supported their expanding
practical agenda by supplying material aid, such as food and medicine.
The support the CO-MADRES found from their allies when they mobilized around
practical gender demands was critical to their capacity to make those demands. The Church
and other allies provided the CO-MADRES with essential resources in a political context
with few viable means of representing opposition demands. Those resources allowed the
CO-MADRES to take advantage of the limited space available to protest government
activity: while few government officials were responsive to the CO-MADRES when they
used formal institutions to demand their children be returned, the support of the Church and
other allies allowed the CO-MADRES to apply pressure more effectively through extra-
institutional tactics.
As the repression increased, the reliability of the CO-MADRES allies declined. Allies
provided less assistance: assaults on the Church and opposition organizations limited their
ability to provide substantial political support for the CO-MADRES demands. Material
support from the Church and humanitarian organizations continued to sustain their
organization, but overt political support for the CO-MADRES demands all but disappeared.
The CO-MADRES, however, were unable to politically represent their practical gender
interests publicly, because the cost of repression was too high.
While the degree to which the CO-MADRES politicized practical gender interests
fluctuated with the availability of resources and political allies, the CO-MADRES did not
politicize strategic gender interests. The CO-MADRES did confront problems with
domestic violence and unequal division of labor in the home. These issues would normally
be considered part of a strategic gender agenda: the problems of domestic violence and
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unequal division of labor in the home would typically be considered part of a strategic
gender agenda because these problems reinforce women's gendered subordination. The
CO-MADRES began to confront these problems as they became obstacles to their political
work. Some of the husbands objected to their wives being gone, and either ordered them
to stop their work or threatened them with force if they continued their work. Other CO-
MADRES found little support at home when it came to helping with domestic chores and
childcare. The CO-MADRES responded to these problems by developing tactics that
confronted the problem on an individual basis. When a CO-MADRE did not show up for a
few days, another CO-MADRE would go to see what the problem was (Stephen 1993: 13-
15; Stephen Forthcoming: 1331-137; Tula 1993). If it was a problem with the husband,
the visiting CO-MADRES would confront the husband. In the case of domestic violence, a
group of CO-MADRES would go to confront the husband, often publicly berating him for
abusing his wife. These tactics effectively confronted the problems they faced in doing
their political work, but during this period, the problems were treated as individual
problems and not as a political problem linked to lack of legal protection for women within
marriage.
Had the CO-MADRES attempted to politicize issues like domestic violence and unequal
division of labor in the home, such an agenda would probably not have been supported by
the CO-MADRES allies, particularly the Church. Although Romero and other progressive
Church leaders encouraged women to participate in the Church and in progressive political
organizations, they encouraged this as an extension of women's traditional role rather than
as a transformation of it. Advancing a political agenda that overtly challenged female
subservience to men would have been more likely to have been opposed by the church than
supported.2 7 Furthermore, at least some of the leadership of the CO-MADRES perceived
27 Throughout Latin America, women who participate in Church activities note the Church's role in
enforcing female subservience. Laywomen and nuns speak about the machismo of the priests they work
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the organized left as hostile to such an agenda. Men and women in the organized left saw
issues like the unequal division of labor within the home and domestic violence as
potentially divisive issues that could fray the unity necessary for a successful revolution:
men who were union members and members of the organized left were among those who
abused their wives and expected domestic chores and childcare to be the full responsibility
of the wives (Tula 1993).
The degree to which the CO-MADRES represented gender interests during this period
fluctuated as political conditions changed. The graph below illustrates the general changes
in gender interest representation between 1977 and 1981:
CO-MADRES Representation
of Gender Interests, 1977-81
Strategic
1981 1980
1977
Practical
Between 1977 and 1980, a rapid increase in the politicization of practical gender interests
and a gradual increase in their actions in the community to address strategic interests took
place. Between 1980 and 1981, there was a decline in political representation of practical
gender interests and a continuation of the CO-MADRES activities within the community
with (Golden 1991: 50). Women often make up the backbone of the Christian Base Communities and
other Church organizations, but they rarely occupy positions of power (Gilfeather 1979: 202). Perhaps
because of the Church's continuing role in the subordination of women within its own organizations,
liberation theologists have been slow to address the problem of gender inequality.
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around strategic gender interests. The CO-MADRES demonstrated a capacity to represent
strategic gender interests at a social level without substantial support from allies throughout
this period, but their capacity to politicize practical gender interests shifted as allies became
less able to give political support and repression increased.
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Chapter Four: Domestic and International Alliances and the
Representation of Gender Interests, 1982-1988
Between 1982-1988 the Salvadoran government liberalized electoral laws while the
military continued to violently repress opposition. Increased military aid from the U.S.
allowed the Salvadoran military to escalate the war against the rebels. During this same
period, however, the Duarte administration initiated the first formal negotiations with the
FMLN. Within this volatile context, the space for opposition activities increased slightly.
Social organizations began to re-emerge in urban areas and overtly oppose the Duarte
administration.
The CO-MADRES were among the first of the opposition organizations to publicly
protest after the massive repression of 1980-81. Once again, they politicized practical
gender interests. By 1985, the CO-MADRES began to politicize strategic gender interests:
they politicized the problem of rape as a form of torture. Material support from U.S. based
solidarity networks and political support from opposition organizations provided critical
support for the politicization of both practical and strategic gender interests.
The Political Context
The civil war in El Salvador escalated during the eighties, despite elections and
negotiations with the FMLN-FDR. For its part, the FMLN-FDR began to develop
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conventional war tactics during the early eighties: larger brigades were instrumental in the
FMLN-FDR control over large areas of the countryside (known as the zones of control).2 8
The Salvadoran army, with U.S. military aid and advising, began massive aerial assaults in
military campaigns such as Operation Phoenix. 2 9 The U.S. gained greater leverage in
Salvadoran politics as the war escalated: as the Salvadoran military became more dependent
on U.S. military aid, the United States was able to use the aid as leverage. 3 0
In 1982 and 1984, under pressure from the United States, the Salvadoran government
held elections for the legislature and the presidency. In 1982, the Reagan administration
pressured the High Command of the Salvadoran to allow elections so the reluctant U.S.
Congress would authorize millions of dollars in military aid. The Reagan Administration
hoped to use the elections to demonstrate to the U.S. Congress that El Salvador was a
'fledgling democracy' under siege by Soviet controlled revolutionary forces (Sundaram
1991: 141). Much to the chagrin of the Reagan Administration, the right-wing ARENA
(Nationalist Republican Alliance) party, not the reformist PDC (Christian Democrat Party),
won the elections for the Constituent Assembly (Norton 1991: 198). ARENA, a party with
fascist tendencies, hardly presented the image of a party committed to reform and
democracy.3 I The Reagan administration intervened through the military to prevent
Roberto D'Aubisson, the founder of the ARENA party, from becoming provisional
2 8 The boundaries of the territory controlled by the FMLN continued to fluctuate throughout the war. By
1982, the FMLN controlled areas north of the departments of CuscatlAn, MorazAn, Chalatenango, Cabafias,
and San Salvador, as well as San Vincente-Volcin Chinchontepec. The control of the FMLN in those
departments continued to expand through the eighties, both in terms of the geographic expansion of the
zones of control, and in terms of the FMLN's increasing political control as well as military control.
(Alvarez 1988: 85).
2 9 Operation Phoenix began in 1986 in the department of Chalatenango. Aerial bombing preceded a sweep
of the territory by five thousand ground troops in an operation which had the main objective of cutting the
FMLN off from civilian support in that area (America's Watch 1991: 57).3 0 One example would be then Vice President George Bush's December 1983 visit to El Salvador. Bush
relayed a threat from the Reagan Administration to cut off aid unless the death squads were brought under
control.
31 D'Aubisson, founder of the ARENA party, stated that the party was modeled on the Nazi party
(NACLA: July 1989:18). Although the party began taking a more moderate turn in the late 80's,
D'Aubisson remained a powerful influence within ARENA until his death in 1992 (Munck 1993: 84)
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president (Norton 1991: 199). The Reagan Administration then pressed for presidential
elections, which took place in 1984. This time, the PDC candidate, Jose Napole6n Duarte,
won 53.6% of the vote (Acevedo 1991: 28).
Shortly after being elected, Duarte took small steps towards negotiating with the FMLN.
In a speech given before the U.N., Duarte invited the FMLN-FDR to a series of
negotiations in La Palma (Karl 1986: 30). Although the negotiations quickly came to a
standstill, they were an important turning point: the Duarte administration treated the subject
of dialogue with the FMLN openly and seriously. Duarte rejected other attempts the
FMLN to continue the dialogue between 1985 and 1986, but returned to the negotiation
table in 1986 (Barry and Castro 1991: 117). Duarte signed the regional Esquipulas peace
plan sponsored by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias on August 7, 1987, which obligated
the Salvadoran government to seriously pursue dialogue with the FMLN as well as to take
specific steps towards reconciliation and democratization (Child 1992: 179).
Regime Responsiveness and Repression
The electoral liberalization that began in the early eighties was not sufficient to create a
government that was responsive to institutionalized democratic channels. Though Duarte
and the legislature exercised some of the powers vested in their offices, the veto power of
the military curtailed the power of the civilians. Duarte was able to institute reforms in the
area of military and death squad conduct, but the military did not abide by those reforms.
The civilian government lacked the capacity to enforce laws without military consent: "The
armed forces have the last word on the subject, and that includes the power to veto or
violate the new measures or simply ignore them" (NACLA 1986: 29).
El Salvador's democratic credentials were essential to the continuation of military aid
from the U.S., however, and the need to maintain at least a superficial appearance of
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democracy created a slight increase in the Salvadoran government's tolerance of and
responsiveness to dissenters. In 1981, the U.S. Congress established a certification
requirement for the continuation of foreign aid: the administration had to issue a biannual
report that, "the Salvadoran Government was 'making a concerted and significant effort to
comply with internationally recognized human rights' and 'achieving substantial control
over all elements of its armed forces' in order to end human rights abuses" (Americas
Watch 1991: 120).3 2 In order to improve the appearance of the electoral process, the
Reagan administration helped to curb the death squad activity and pressured the military
and the right to allow more open activity by the opposition (Karl 1986: 27). Duarte
managed to institute some reforms, including strengthening the judicial system and
establishing investigatory commissions to handle complaints against the death squads and
the military (NACLA 1986: 29). Coercive tactics changed to rely on selective repression
of opposition leadership, rather than overt attacks on protest marches and demonstrations.
The Shape of the Opposition, 1982-88
Opposition organizations began to re-emerge in the mid-eighties. Initially, the Duarte
administration allowed unions and organizations that supported the PDC to mobilize. The
Popular Democratic Union (UPD), which united campesino and urban trade unions signed
a social pact with the PDC in 1984 (Zamora 1991: 185). 3 3 Eventually, however,
organizations that opposed the PDC began to represent their demands openly. For
example, urban women's organizations re-emerged in the late eighties. Some of the most
3 2 Although certification was no longer a pre-condition for military aid after the 1983 Presidential veto,
many Congress members continued to oppose sending aid based on the flagrant abuse of human rights
(America's Watch 1991: 132).
33 The PDC's incapacity to fulfill campaign promises created a serious rift within the UPD by 1985, and in
1986 a faction of the UPD joined with opposition unions and organizations to form the National Unity of
Salvadoran Workers (Zamora 1991: 188).
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prominent urban women's organizations were: the Women's Committee of the National
Federation of Salvadoran Workers (CO-FENESTRAS),3 4 the Institute for Research
Training and Development of Women (IMU), and the National Coordination of Salvadoran
Women (CONAMUS). 3 5 All of these organizations openly opposed the Duarte
administration and the PDC.
By the end of the eighties FDR leaders were attempting to build a legal political coalition
that would represent a united popular opposition. The Esquipulas II plan allowed the
leaders of the FDR to return to El Salvador. In November 1987, two opposition parties,
the MPSC and the MNR, joined to form the Democratic Convergence (CD). The CD's
platform included four main proposals: the negotiated end of the war, a program for socio-
economic recovery, democratization, and a non-aligned foreign policy (Zamora 1991: 192).
The Church facilitated the coalition-building by sponsoring the National Debate in the
summer of 1988. Archbishop Rivera y Damas brought sixty organizations, ranging from
the center to the left, together to discuss an agenda for the opposition. 3 6 By the end of the
summer, they produced an agenda that included a negotiated solution to the war, respect for
human rights, and a mixed economy and created a permanent commission to continue the
debate (Blachman and Sharpe 1989: 114).
3 4 CO-FENESTRAS is the women's branch of FENESTRAS, the National Federation of Salvadoran
Workers. Like other women's branches of unions, CO-FENESTRAS was created not only to represent
specific concerns of women workers, but to bring more women into active participation in the unions.Kelly
Ready presented a similar analysis of the women's committee of the public hospital worker's union
(COFASTISS) in "Las Ciganbas: The Salvadoran Women's Movement," a paper presented at the 1993
National Women's Studies Association.
35 CONAMUS, created in 1986, established a women's health clinic and a legal aid clinic which deal
specifically (although not exclusively) with domestic violence and rape (Golden 1991: 113). The IMU was
founded by female academics from the Jesuit University of Central America, and helps women to develop
projects which provide solutions for the day-to-day problems they face in their life. Both CONAMUS and
the IMU are explicitly feminist.
3 6 The National Debate included students organizations, labor unions, small business associations, human
rights organizations, and churches.
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CO-MADRES and the Political Process: 1983-1988
Until 1983, Alicia Sayalenda, a small restaurant owner, led the CO-MADRES. In
1983, a directorate was elected for the first time (Schirmer 1993: 37). The precise number
of women in the directorate fluctuated as the movement expanded and the leadership
structure changed.3 7 By 1986, the CO-MADRES included approximately 700 women
(Acosta 1993: 132; Enough Crying of Tears 1986). Approximately fifty of the members
worked on a full-time basis for the CO-MADRES. 3 8
The growth in membership and institutionalization of decision-making procedures
occurred amid a political context that allowed limited degree space for opposition activity.
The CO-MADRES took advantage of and created new opportunities as repression
diminished. Their ties to U.S. solidarity networks and domestic opposition provided key
support for the expansion and politicization of their agenda, which included both practical
and strategic gender interests.
37 Each officer took primary responsibility for the various commissions within the organization as well as
taking part in decisions which effected the movement as a whole. By 1988, the Commissions included:
the Organizing Commission, in charge of recruitment and providing food and clothing for the mothers; the
Public Relations commission, responsible for producing documents to send to international organizations;
Publications and Projects Commission, which produced public statements, recorded testimonies, and made
up packets for international delegations; the Finance Commission, which received financial aid from all
international and domestic sources and allocated funds; and the Commission on Refugees and Displaced
Persons which organized visits to refugee camps and provided assistance to refugees (New Americas Press
1989: 61).
38 Because of the rapid increase in active members, CO-MADRES developed an informal political training
program for its members. Some of the older CO-MADRES noticed that it was always the same women
speaking at public events or taking responsibility for the more complicated tasks. Particularly in the case
of public speaking, they attributed this to a lack of confidence. Before certain events newer members were
asked to be responsible for a part of the presentation. While the older members would assist if the newer
ones ran into serious problems, they expected the new members to take primary responsibility for the day's
event. After the event was over, they would work with the new members on improving their abilities (to
speak loudly and clearly, not to fidget, and look confident in what they are saying). However, the most
important part of this "training" was to give the new members the push to speak in public so they could
begin to develop confidence (Tula 1993).
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Regime Repression, Responsiveness and the CO-MADRES, 1982-88
Late in 1983, the CO-MADRES began to publicly protest once again (New Americas
Press 1989: 29). They adopted a uniform: they dressed in black with white scarves and a
red and white carnation. 3 9 As the presidential elections of 1984 grew closer, the
leadership of CO-MADRES perceived presence of international observers and media
representatives as an indication that the military would be less likely to repress their
demands. They also expected to receive greater international attention by protesting in the
presence of international observers (Tula 1993). They began to stage bimonthly sit-ins at
the U.S. Embassy, the Ministry of Justice and the Legislative Assembly (Acosta 1993:
133).
After Duarte's election, the CO-MADRES found there was more room for open political
activity. On November 5, the CO-MADRES organized a march of 3,000 people through
San Salvador. The military did not interfere with the march, although military police
arrested many of the leaders a few days after the march. Later in November, the CO-
MADRES and other human rights groups organized a human rights conference in San
Salvador (Thompsen 1986: 149).
If the new government was less apt to violently repress public protests, it was not
responsive to the CO-MADRES when they used institutional channels to represent their
demands. In the summer and fall of 1987 they presented 120 habeus corpus appeals to
the supreme court that went unanswered. A telegram from the Minister of Justice also
demonstrated the non-responsive nature of the Duarte administration: "I consider the
audience solicited in order to treat the situation of the political prisoners inappropriate now
3 9 The black dress represents mourning for each of the victims, the white headscarf symbolizes peace, the
red carnation symbolizes the blood of the victims, the white is for the disappeared, and the green leaves are
for hope (Schirmer 1993: 33).
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that political prisoners can be found in no prison in the country" (Sentir Con El Pueblo
June 1988).
The Duarte administration did not end the repression of CO-MADRES entirely.
Although the new government tolerated marches and public demonstrations, the leadership
of CO-MADRES and their offices came under increasing attack. By 1986, fourteen
members had been captured, disappeared or assassinated (CO-MADRES Bulletin
March/April/ May 1986), and the numbers continued to rise through the late eighties. In
1986, before being arrested by the military, men in civilian clothes, possibly members of a
death squad, captured and interrogated Maria Teresa Tula (Tula 1993). The CO-MADRES
office was bombed two more times in these five years: in 1986 and 1987 (Schirmer 1993:
40).4 0
Accusations that CO-MADRES was a front group for the FMLN justified the attacks on
the organization. On February 11, 1986, Ambassador Corr of the U.S. Embassy in El
Salvador, accused the organization of being a front for the FMLN (CO-MADRES Bulletin
Fall 1987). In August of 1987, the Salvadoran government published two blurred
photographs of a CO-MADRES and armed guerrilla, that were ostensibly of the same
woman (CO-MADRES Bulletin Fall 1987). Declaring the CO-MADRES a terrorist
organization with connections to the FMLN allowed the government to apply different
standards for the arrest and treatment of the CO-MADRES leaders (CO-MADRES Bulletin
Autumn/Winter 1988).
The CO-MADRES argued that the repressive and non-responsive new government was
not democratic. 4 1 The lack of power or willingness on the part of the new government to
4 0 The offices were ransacked after each bombing, and the CO-MADRES lost most of their documents and
their supplies, as well as humanitarian aid like food and medicine.
41 They repeatedly declared that the new government could not be called a democracy : "Monsefior Romero
proclaimed that in El Salvador there existed a false order and peace which was based on repression and fear.
Today he would declare that the alleged "democracy" is also false and rooted in a strategy of war against the
Salvadoran people, which is supported by the U.S. government." (CO-MADRES Bulletin March/ April/
May 1986).
58
seriously confront injustice and human rights violations rendered its democratic credentials
meaningless. Rather, the new government and its program, "serve to confuse the domestic
and international opinion and damage the credibility of the struggle of the popular
opposition" (Madre Salvadorefia, May 16-June 15).
Tactical Development and New Alliances
As it became increasingly apparent that institutional channels were still ineffective, the
CO-MADRES continued to develop new extra-institutional tactics. Some of the old tactics,
such as sit-ins and contacting international human rights organizations, continued to be
useful to the CO-MADRES. Other tactics, however, were less reliable. The CO-MADRES
could not rely on the Church to the extent that they had previously due to growing tensions
in their relationship with the Church. Instead, the most significant allies became domestic
opposition organizations and their solidarity network in the United States, known as
"Friends of CO-MADRES."
The CO-MADRES continued to rely on the tactics they had developed in earlier years.
They denounced human rights violation through paid ads in domestic newspapers, public
marches, and protests at embassies, government buildings, and prisons (CO-MADRES
Bulletin January-March 1987). They increased their involvement with international human
rights organizations such as FEDEFAM.4 2 They also strengthened their relationship with
domestic human rights organizations. In 1987, CO-MADRES joined with two other
human rights organizations (CODEFAM, the Committee of Families for the Liberty of
Political Prisoners and Disappeared, and COMAFAC, Christian Committee of Mothers and
Relatives of the Disappeared) in the Federation of Committees of Mothers and Families of
4 2 In 1983, a CO-MADRE was elected president of FEDEFAM, and FEDEFAM nominated the CO-
MADRES for the Robert F. Kennedy human rights award in 1984 (Tula 1993).
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Political Prisoners, Disappeared, and Assassinated--FECMAFAM (New Americas Press
1989: 57).
The Church, however, became a less reliable ally. The Church did continue to provide
material aid to the CO-MADRES: access to the Church radio station YSAX, food and
clothing, and an office in the Archdiocese from 1982-84 (Tula 1993). A major rift
developed between the Church and the CO-MADRES, however, over the CO-MADRES
periodic occupation of the Cathedral.4 3  The occupation of the Cathedral forced the
Archbishop to deliver the weekly mass in other churches. The Archbishop ordered the CO-
MADRES to cease their occupation of the Cathedral. In 1987, Archbishop Rivera y
Damas threatened to excommunicate the leadership of the CO-MADRES if they occupied
the Cathedral again. When asked if they would take the Cathedral again, the CO-
MADRES said they would if necessary: "God knows that we occupy the Church because
of necessity not whim...The Church isn't a building, we ourselves, all of us, are the
Church" (CO-MADRES Bulletin January-March 1987).
In contrast, the CO-MADRES found the re-emerging urban left to be an increasingly
reliable ally. After opposition groups began to re-surface in San Salvador, the CO-
MADRES built alliances with other opposition groups. They worked particularly closely
with FENESTRAS, COPPES and CDHES. Whenever a member of any of the
organizations was captured, for instance, the organizations would show solidarity with the
other organizations and protest the capture publicly. The CO-MADRES felt that these joint
actions gave them greater leverage than staging demonstrations independently (Tula 1993).
Although the CO-MADRES clearly relied on some sectors of the organized left, their
relationship to the FMLN during this period was somewhat unclear. Individual members
of the CO-MADRES were affiliated personally with one of the revolutionary parties of the
43 By 1987, the CO-MADRES had taken the Metropolitan Cathedral fifty times (CO-MADRES Bulletin
Jan.-March 1987).
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FMLN (Tula 1993), some of whom may have been leaders. Due to changes in leadership
and fluctuation in active membership, it was not clear that there was any kind of stable
relationship between the CO-MADRES and the FMLN.4 4 The consistent denial by the
CO-MADRES of any ties to the FMLN complicates the question further. 4 5
The FMLN, however, offered important political support for CO-MADRES demands. In
a general sense, the FMLN represented some of the same issues that the CO-MADRES
prioritized on their agenda during this period. The CO-MADRES continued to struggle for
their basic demand for the respect for human rights, and by 1985 expanded their agenda to
include opposition to military aid from the U.S. and supporting the dialogue between the
FMLN and the government.4 6 More specifically, the FMLN provided assistance to the
CO-MADRES by applying pressure in particular cases of human rights abuses. On at least
one occasion the FMLN negotiated a prisoner swap for ten members of the CDHES and the
CO-MADRES for soldiers captured by the FMLN (America's Watch 152).
Liberal North American political elites also applied pressure on behalf of the CO-
MADRES. One of the most consistent allies of the CO-MADRES was the Kennedy
family. In 1984, the CO-MADRES received the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights award
that included an award of $30,000 dollars. From that point on, Senator Kennedy
44 Conversation with Lynn Stephen
45 The CO-MADRES refuted many charges that they were connected to the FMLN, and issued strong
criticisms of the FMLN's tactic of kidnapping and of their use of mines (CO-MADRES Bulletins, Spring
1986, Autumn/Winter 1988). They also point out that they include mothers of soldiers from the military
as well as mothers of opposition activists.
46 The incorporation of the opposition to military aid and the support for the dialogue case became part of
the public agenda after the elections and negotiations in La Palma created small openings. The CO-
MADRES began to publicly oppose military aid during the elections when there were many international
observers and members of the foreign press. The presence of international observers and press offered
protection, as the government was less likely to retaliate, and publicity for the CO-MADRES demands,
particularly in the U.S (Tula 1993). The CO-MADRES publicly prioritized negotiations and dialogue after
the meetings in La Palma. The CO-MADRES demonstrated at La Palma (Shenk 1984: 4), and shortly
thereafter, they began to publicly demand a continuation of the dialogue process. Before the La Palma
negotiations, supporting a dialogue with the FMLN was extremely dangerous, but when President Duarte
took an important step towards negotiation by meeting with FMLN leaders at La Palma, he also provided
an opening for others to support it (Shenk 1984:4).
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frequently intervened on behalf of the CO-MADRES with the Salvadoran government and
the Reagan Administration (Tula 1993). Other Democratic Senators and Representatives,
including Congressmen Moakley and Levine, and Senators Dodd and Leahy, made
numerous appeals on behalf of the CO-MADRES to the U.S. and Salvadoran governments
and fought for political asylum for two CO-MADRES, America Sosa and Maria Teresa
Tula.4 7
A particularly important ally was the North American solidarity organization, "Friends
of CO-MADRES." In 1985, America Sosa, a CO-MADRE, opened a U.S. office based
in Washington D.C. With the help of North American activists, and Maria Teresa Tula after
1987, she organized the solidarity network. The "Friends of CO-MADRES" and the two
representatives in Washington had three basic purposes:
(1) Inform Congress, human rights organizations, religious groups, the press and
the general public on human rights abuses in El Salvador, which, despite
declarations to the contrary, are still in effect.
(2) Organize delegations of North American citizens to travel to El Salvador in
Solidarity with CO-MADRES.
(3) Seek material aid, especially economic, for various CO-MADRES projects in El
Salvador" (CO-MADRES pamphlet).
The CO-MADRES office in D.C. published a bulletin of the CO-MADRES activities and
updated subscribers on the situation of human rights in El Salvador. The D.C. Office was
also responsible for organizing "accompaniments": delegations of U.S. citizens who
accompanied the CO-MADRES in El Salvador and provided a kind of protection from
government abuses through their presence. 4 8  Finally, the D.C. office organized
fundraising drives, soliciting funds to help publish the paid advertisements and purchase
4 7 These appeals include letters to the U.S. ambassador in El Salvador, the High Command of the Armed
Forces, and President Duarte, some of which are kept by the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Office (CO-
MADRES Bulletin Summer 1990 and Winter 1992; Tula 1993).
48 The accompaniments began in 1987. Delegations were generally available when the CO-MADRES
needed them, although there were some periods when the CO-MADRES decided it was too dangerous for the
Americans (Tula 1993).
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supplies, as well as donations of equipment such as cameras and IBM compatible
computers. 4 9
Interests and Objectives: 1982-1988
CO-MADRES again politicized gender interests and began to politicize strategic gender
interests. Repression and limited resources continued to constrain the capacity of the CO-
MADRES to carry out new projects and represent gender interests. The CO-MADRES
were able to politically represent practical and strategic gender interests publicly with the
assistance of other opposition organizations and the Friends of CO-MADRES.
The CO-MADRES expanded their agenda to include more issues that would be
considered to represent practical gender interests. Throughout the 1980's, they continued
to speak out as mothers against human rights abuses, particularly those against their family
members. They also began to speak out as mothers against the horrors of the civil war.
As the number of displaced persons increased throughout the eighties, they began to work
with refugees and provide food for displaced persons through their office. They began to
organize programs to care for orphans of human rights victims. As mothers, they
disparaged all the suffering caused by the war, but most frequently, they decried the
suffering of the children.
The CO-MADRES received material support for their relief projects from the Church
and from humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross and Green Cross. Although
the conflict over the occupation of the Cathedral had strained the CO-MADRES
relationship with the Church, the Church and other humanitarian organizations continued to
4 9 The exact numbers of members of "Friends of CO-MADRES" and the amount of financial support the
friends supply is not readily available. Some indication of the size and strength of the organization is the
geographic dispersion of their activities. The Friends had representations in California, New York,
Massachusetts, Washington state, Washington D.C., Michigan, and Iowa. They were able to provide
financial support through speaking tours by America Sosa and Maria Teresa Tula, and fundraising concerts
by Bonnie Raitt.
63
provide material aid to support the CO-MADRES efforts to care for the community affected
by the war. Though the Archbishop chastised the CO-MADRES for some of their
activities, he continued to praise the maternal instincts their humanitarian projects
illustrated.
Government sabotage of the CO-MADRES projects, however, limited their capacity to
expand their practical gender agenda. One particularly tragic example of government
sabotage occurred when the CO-MADRES set up an orphanage for children of human
rights victims. The CO-MADRES rented a house in Colonia Santa Lucia where they began
an orphanage for about one hundred children. Military police came to the house and took
eighty-four children. The CO-MADRES found children's bodies in El Play6n.5 o The CO-
MADRES took the remaining sixteen children to different private homes (Schirmer 1993:
45).
Scarcity of organizational resources further constrained the CO-MADRES' ability to
expand their practical agenda. Prioritizing new objectives meant making difficult choices:
War in El Salvador means mothers with children come to the CO-MADRES office,
sent from other offices, asking for rice and beans for their hungry children.
Hungry children and pleading mothers leave the CO-MADRES facing a difficult
decision. To say yes to helping the mothers of the hungry children means the CO-
MADRES may start a soup kitchen and therefore start re-directing energy away
from the founding purpose of denouncing human rights abuses.
(CO-MADRES Bulletin Winter/Spring 1989)
Expanding their practical agenda was predicated on the availability of human resources, as
well as material resources. Devoting time to the new projects often meant less time for
human rights work. The CO-MADRES main priority was still to press for a guarantee for
human rights and that work continued to take the majority of their time.5 '
50 El Play6n is a body dump near San Salvador.
51 It is important to note, however, that while specific acts of repression limited the capacity of the CO-
MADRES to effectively carry out their projects, the coercive tactics of the regime paradoxically provided
the impetus for those same projects. The need to supply medicine to political prisoners is rooted in the fact
that there were political prisoners. Likewise, the need to care for orphans of the assassinated is connected to
the repressive policies of the military. Although the CO-MADRES chose which interests they could
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The instance in which the CO-MADRES politicized a strategic gender interest was when
they publicly protested the use of rape and sexual degradation as torture by the military and
death squads. Rape, and violence against women more generally, would be considered a
strategic gender problem because it enforces gendered subordination: violence takes away
an individual's capacity to make decisions for herself, and when violence against women is
widespread or unobstructed by political and social institutions, it becomes an obstacle to
women's equality generally. By 1985, the CO-MADRES denounced specific acts of rape
by the military in their newsletters and in public protests (CO-MADRES Bulletin March-
April 1986; Enough Crying of Tears 1986; Sentir con El Pueblo June 1988; Solidaridad
1985). 5 2
Though the CO-MADRES did politicize the problem of rape during this period, they
did not represent strategic gender interests to a high degree. The degree to a public
denunciation of rape represents strategic gender interests depends of the degree to which
the denunciation confronts women's gendered subordination. Although the CO-MADRES
did politicize the problem of rape, they only denounced specific crimes committed by the
military. They did not denounce the problem of rape in society at large. Thus, while the
CO-MADRES politicized rape, the extent to which they politicized strategic gender interests
was low.
Assistance from other opposition organizations and the international solidarity network
made the politicization of rape possible. One of the difficulties in denouncing the use of
represent and how, the failure of the government to provide a system in which practical interests were
addressed (or at least not deliberately obstructed) is the basis of the CO-MADRES practical agenda.
Mariclaire Acosta makes a similar point: "Giving aid and relief to political prisoners and their families and
adopting children can be seen merely as an extension of the mothering role. However, the political content
of this activity is radically different from normal charitable action: the CO-MADRES have to mother a
whole people because the institutions that normally do so in society have proven their inability" (Acosta
1993: 139).
52 The use of rape as torture has been practiced throughout Latin America as part of a counter-insurgency
strategy (Bunster 1993). In El Salvador, members of the military, the police and the death squads have been
implicated in the use of rape as physical and psychological torture (Stephen 1993: 11).
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rape by the military was that the victims were unwilling to testify to the rape. When victims
of the military or the death squads testified to human rights activists from the CDHES or
the CO-MADRES, they would often not speak about their rape (Tula 1993). 5 3 One of the
places women began to discover that rape was a common experience was in the political
prisons (Tula 1993). The women's sector of COPPES (the Committee of Political
Prisoners of El Salvador) began to denounce the use of rape against political prisoners and
encouraged victims to denounce their rapes publicly through the CDHES or the CO-
MADRES (Enough Crying of Tears 1986; Tula 1993). The activism by COPPES around
the issue of rape was critical to the CO-MADRES capacity to issue specific
denunciations. 5 4
Assistance from the Friends of CO-MADRES was essential to publicizing the
denunciations within El Salvador and abroad. Though the CO-MADRES denounced the
rapes in the public demonstrations, newsletters provided an equally valuable means to
publicize the problem. The Friends of CO-MADRES provided the economic and material
resources necessary to produce the newsletters in El Salvador (this included a computer the
CO-MADRES received in 1988). The newsletter written in the Washington D.C. office
also denounced the rapes. Catherine Russo, a friend of the CO-MADRES, further
publicized the problem of rape in a documentary she produced about the CO-MADRES. In
the film, Alicia, a leader of the CO-MADRES, testifies about her own rape, and the CO-
MADRES and COPPES jointly denounce the rape of prisoners in Mariona (one of several
women's prisons where political prisoners are kept). This film aired in 1987 throughout
53 Men who were raped were even more reluctant to admit to it. Although this practice has been uncovered
by medical practitioners, there have been few public denunciations of this practice (Stephen 1993: 12)
54 Even if there was medical evidence that a victim had been raped, it was essential that the victim
denounce the rape and consent that denunciation be made public: the CO-MADRES would not publicize any
denunciation if the victim or the victims relatives did not consent and sign a denunciation for their records
(Tula 1993).
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the United States on PBS, publicizing the CO-MADRES denunciation of rape tactics to a
large North American audience.
The capacity of CO-MADRES to represent both practical and strategic gender interests
expanded during this period. The graph below illustrates the general pattern of expansion.
CO-MADRES Rcpresentation
of Gender Interests, 1982-88
Strategic
1982 1985 1988
Practical
Between 1982 and 1985, the CO-MADRES steadily expanded their practical gender
agenda. Material support from the Church and humanitarian organizations facilitated the
expansion, but state repression and finite resources constrained it. After 1985, the CO-
MADRES continued to expand their practical gender agenda, and began to politicize
strategic gender interests to a limited degree. These expansions were possible because of
material support from the "Friends of CO-MADRES" and the political and material support
of opposition activities like COPPES. Though the CO-MADRES were not highly active
around strategic gender interests, that they represented this type of interests to any extent is
a significant counterpoint to those who would argue that femenina organizations cannot
represent strategic gender interests at all.
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Chapter 5: The Peace Process and Gender Interests, 1989-1993
From 1989-1993, CO-MADRES greatly expanded their practical and strategic gender
agenda. They created development projects that targeted women in particular. Beginning
in 1990, the CO-MADRES characterized themselves as an organization that promoted
"women's self-development projects" (CO-MADRES Bulletin Summer 1990). CO-
MADRES began to form coalitions with other women's organizations and increasingly
politicized strategic gender issues. Alliances with other women's organizations and
ongoing support from international solidarity networks provided the CO-MADRES with
the resources and political support necessary to politicize an agenda specific to women.
The Political Context
In 1989, Freddy Cristiani, a member of the right-wing ARENA party, defeated the
Christian Democrat, Fidel ChAvez Mena, by 167,001 votes in the presidential election
(EguizAbal 1992: 148). Though ARENA's margin of victory was great, the victory did not
represent support by the majority of registered voters: a record number abstained in the
1989 presidential elections, even though voting was mandatory.5 5  Opposition
organizations vehemently opposed Cristiani and denounced the supposedly democratic
elections. After the ARENA victory, attacks on opposition political organizations began to
55 Out of 1,834,00 registered voters, only 1,003,153 went to the polls (Eguiz7bal 1992: 148)
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increase. The new administration declared a state of emergency, suspending constitutional
guarantees such as free speech, and enacted anti-terrorist legislation that legalized state
repression of dissent (Arnson 1991a: 72; LeoGrande 1991: 129; Popkin 1991:78; NACLA
1989: 35). Reports of detention and torture rose and opposition offices were ransacked and
destroyed (Popkin 1991: 77).5 6
The FMLN initiated the Battle of San Salvador in November 1989 in response to the
new wave of violence against the opposition. The FMLN launched an offensive in seven of
the departments of El Salvador, and occupied six neighborhoods in San Salvador
(LeoGrande 1991: 114). Government forces defeated the FMLN, but political analysts
have treated the Battle of San Salvador as a political victory for the FMLN (LeoGrande
1991; Montgomery 1992). The occupation of areas of San Salvador required significant
support from civilians in those areas (civilians collaborated by concealing arms and
combatants), revealing that the FMLN had significant popular support (LeoGrande 1991:
122). The government forces, on the other hand, were unable to combat the FMLN
successfully with ground troops, so they resorted to aerial bombing of the occupied
neighborhoods (Montgomery 1992: 114).5 7  The international community broadly
condemned the aerial assaults for their cost in civilian lives (Eguizibal 1993: 135).
Negotiations, Regime Responsiveness, and Repression
Although the ARENA victory and the FMLN offensive do not seem to indicate strong
prospects for peace, the power shifts that occurred in 1989 actually created conditions in
56 Two of the most infamous attacks on the opposition during this period occurred on October 31: the
FENESTRAS headquarters was bombed, killing ten people and injuring 29, and the CO-MADRES office
was bombed again, injuring four people.
57 The neighborhoods which were targeted for the aerial strikes were the poor neighborhoods where the
initial FMLN actions were launched: the government forces did not bomb the wealthy areas which the
FMLN later occupied, such as the neighborhood of Escal6n (Montgomery 1992: 115)
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which negotiations and democratization efforts became more successful. ARENA, while
still strongly influenced by right-wing extremists, presented a National Peace Proposal
during the campaign. The program included a proposal for the incorporation of the FMLN
into the political system (EguizAbal 1992: 144). In Cristiani's inaugural address, he
proposed a plan for negotiations that did not require the FMLN's surrender. The FMLN,
for its part, dropped its demand for power sharing and increasingly focused on victory
through the electoral system rather than on the battlefield. The FMLN offered to support the
1989 elections conditioned on a postponement of the elections until September (EguizAbal
1992: 147). The FMLN and the Cristiani administration did not reach an agreement by
February, so the FMLN proceeded to boycott the elections. The Democratic Convergence
(CD), an offshoot of the FDR, however, did participate in the elections with Guillermo
Ungo as their presidential candidate. Although the CD garnered only 3.8% of the vote, its
participation marked the beginning of the participation of the organized left in electoral
politics.
Changes in U.S. policy under the Bush administration also improved the prospects for a
negotiated settlement and a possible transition to democracy. The Bush administration
"opened the way for a shift in U.S. policy, away from a rigid ideological stance and
towards a more pragmatic position" (Munck 1993: 80). The new administration was less
willing to provide military aid than the Reagan administration had been and more willing to
use aid as leverage to pressure the Cristiani government to push forth on negotiations (Karl
1992: 153).5 8
Finally, the increased role of the U.N. set the stage for a negotiated solution to the civil
war. By early 1990, the U.N. was working with the FMLN and the Cristiani
58 After a congressional investigation implicated the High Command of the military in the November
1989 killing of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter by the military, the U.S. Congress cut
military aid in half. (Karl 1992:152; Munck 1993:81). The congress did authorize the Bush administration
to restore the aid if the FMLN began another offensive (Munck 1993: 82). After the FMLN launched an
offensive in 1990, Bush restored the aid, but continued to use the aid as leverage (EguizAbal 1992: 153).
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administration to bring them together for a series of U.N. mediated talks. The first talks
took place in May 1990. By June both parties agreed that the U.N. would monitor human
rights (Montgomery 1993: 114).5 9 and that a U.N. sponsored "Truth Commission" would
document past human rights abuses and recommend steps to resolve the human rights
problem.6 0 The negotiation process ended on January 16, 1991, with the signing of the
Peace Accords. Between 1991-93, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN made slow
progress towards the implementation of the Accords.
During the negotiations and since the signing of the peace accords, the space for
legitimate opposition activity in the political arena gradually opened. Legal barriers to
participation, however, gradually began to disappear: laws forbidding association with the
FMLN, for example, were undone by the recognition of the FMLN as a legal political
party. The participation of the CD in 1989 brought leaders of the FDR legally into the
political system. The CD's electoral support was relatively small in 1989 and 1991: only
3.8% of the vote in 1989 and 12% in 1991. The party won eight seats in the legislature,
however, and Ruben Zamora, klFader of the CD, became vice-president of the legislature
(Munck 1993: 82).
Violent repression, however, continued even into 1993: the CDHES recorded 160 extra-
judicial executions, 242 illegal detentions, and 14 disappearances during the first four
months of 1993 (CDHES July 1993). In spite of continued repression, the negotiation
process led to concrete agreements to reduce human rights abuses. In 1991, the FMLN
and the government signed a human rights accord. Human rights activists questioned the
sincerity of the government in signing because human rights abuses continued even after
the agreement was signed. The accord did establish important new mechanisms for the
5 9 The U.N observer team is apparently the first of its kind (Montgomery 1993: 114).
6 0 The Truth Commission's report found that the majority of human rights abuses were committed by the
military and the death squads. The Commission proposed a series of reforms within the judicial system and
the military, as well as punishment of those officials and FMLN leaders implicated in the report (U.N.
1993).
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protection of human rights that yielded concrete results. For example, the accord created
the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). The mission placed 100
observers throughout the country who had the authority to visit prisons unannounced.
These powers made the ONUSAL an important deterrent to human rights abuses and its
impact was visible shortly after its establishmer.: (Arnson 1991b: 89).
The Changing Shape of the Opposition
The tactics and strategies of the left began to develop in new directions in response to the
changing political context. The CD's decision to take advantage of new openings and
participate in the 1989 and 1991 elections presented an alternative to the FMLN's strategy.
The increased pluralism within the left created conditions in which organizations could
operate more independently. Salvadoran women's organizations, in particular, formed
new coalitions and used their strength to make demands of the left as well as of government
officials. The growing independence of Salvadoran women's organizations illustrated a
trend repeated within the opposition as whole: as repression declined and the range of
opposition strategies expanded, opposition organizations became less dependent on the
FMLN.
In the late eighties, it was very difficult for opposition organizations to function openly.
For example, as women's organizations re-emerged in the cities, they again became
subjects of regime repression. The office of ADEMUSA (the Association of Salvadoran
Women) was ransacked, and the clinic operated by CONAMUS was bombed in 1989
(Ready 1993: 23-24). Many of the organizations depended on support from the FMLN for
their survival. In fact, the revolutionary parties were often responsible for establishing new
organizations, such as the Salvadoran Movement of Women (MSM) and the Union of
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Salvadoran Women (UMS). These organizations maintained close connections with the
FMLN and depended on its support (America's Press 1989: 76).
After the initial negotiations of the peace accords, new opposition coalitions with varying
degrees of independence from the FMLN began to emerge. As of 1993, there were two
major coalitions of women's organizations. The first was the COM, the Coordinating
Organization of Women, which included ADEMUSA, CONAMUS, MSM, and the
Association of Salvadoran Women (AMS). The second coalition was the Concertacion,
which included women from twenty-five organizations, including women in the
government and a group of women who were closely connected to the Resistencia Nacional
(National Resistance, one of the five revolutionary parties). The COM had a political
vision that was more closely aligned to the FMLN, and the Concertacion was focused more
on gender-specific issues than the COM (Ready 1993: 28). A temporary coalition, called
Women in the 1994 Election (Mujeres '94), planned to submit a platform of women's
interests to all of the political parties before the election (Stephen 1993: 18). These new
coalitions, particularly the Concertacion and Mujeres '94, illustrated the growing capacity
of women's organizations to form coalitions independently and across party lines. These
coalitions increased their strength to make demands of party leaders and the government:
the Mujeres '94 coalition represented an unprecedented attempt to join fourteen women's
organizations and jointly press for their demands before an election.
The CO-MADRES and the Political Process, 1989-1993
Under pressure from the U.N. and the FMLN, the ARENA government became more
responsive to human rights demands. The six CD officials that were elected to the
legislature in 1991 prioritized human rights issues and supported the CO-MADRES
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demands. The new openings allowed the CO-MADRES to represent their demands more
effectively in spite of ongoing repression.
The Effects of Responsiveness and Repression on the CO-MADRES, 1989-1993
The CO-MADRES were still targets of state repression even through the early months
of 1993. The office was bombed again in 1989: this time, six CO-MADRES, a child,
and a North American were injured (Schirmer 1993: 40-41). The office was ransacked a
few weeks later, and all the office supplies and documents were confiscated (CO-MADRES
Bulletin March 1990). The National Police used the ARENA Anti-Terrorist law to arrest
several CO-MADRES for protesting, and the Treasury Police abducted several CO-
MADRES late in 1989 (Schirmer 1993 40-41). As late as 1993, the son of a CO-MADRE
was abducted and killed (Tula 1993)
Initially,the ARENA government was not any more responsive to the CO-MADRES
demands than the Duarte Administration had been. The interactions with the ARENA
government were remarkably similar to those with the Duarte administration. The Treasury
Police, for example, refused to return property confiscated in the 1989 raid and sought to
discredit the CO-MADRES by stating that the confiscated property included explosive
devices (Golden 1991: 109).
In spite of apparently dim prospects, the ARENA government agreed to a number of the
CO-MADRES most important demands in the Peace Accords. The earliest accord
specifically agreed to important protection for human rights, including respect for the lives
and bodily integrity of all Salvadorans, respect for the due process of law, and the right to
associate freely in political organizations (CO-MADRES Bulletin Summer 1990). The
terms reached in the final Peace Accord agreement included agreements to other CO-
MADRES demands: a major re-structuring of the reduction of the Armed Forces and the
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dissolution of the National Guard and the Treasury police, and agreement by the FMLN
and the government to a cease-fire.
Although the CO-MADRES applauded the content of the Peace Accords,
representatives expressed doubt that the accord would be implemented: "The agreement
includes respect for the lives, integrity, security of the people, due process of law,
personal liberty, liberty of expression, and liberty of association. Implementation remains
dubious at present...What is new is potential oversight by the U.N., but this supervision
will only be put in place after a cease-fire." (CO-MADRES Bulletin Summer 1990).
Leaders also expressed concern that the governments agreement to the Accords represented
an attempt to manipulate the U.N. rather than sincere respect for human rights. Celia
Beltrdn of CO-MADRES cautioned the U.N. in a newspaper article printed in El Diario to
be suspicious of the governments willingness to end the war and pursue social justice (CO-
MADRES July/August 1990).
In spite of these reservations, the Accords created new political openings and that
allowed the CO-MADRES to represent their demands more effectively. The CO-MADRES
gained greater access to U.N. human rights monitors and elected officials under the
accords. Since the U.N. observation mission began, the CO-MADRES have been able to
report human rights violations directly to U.N. representatives throughout El Salvador
(Tula 1993). The election of the six Democratic Convergence candidates in the 1991
election brought the first close allies of the CO-MADRES into institutional politics: Ruben
Zamora and the others were viewed by the CO-MADRES as genuine advocates of human
rights, while progressive Christian Democrats who proclaimed to be advocates of human
rights were viewed skeptically because of their parties close alliance with the military (Tula
1993). The 1991 election marked the initial opening of a new kind of representation for the
CO-MADRES: representation through elected officials.
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Alliances and Tactical Development
The CO-MADRES began to participate in formal coalitions with other opposition
organizations. In particular, the CO-MADRES began to work with other women's
organizations and became part of an important coalition of women's organizations, Mujeres
'94. The new coalitions focused increasingly on influencing political parties and elected
representatives. Although the CO-MADRES continued to use protest tactics independently,
they began to pressure elected officials and parties to represent their demands through the
new coalitions.
The CO-MADRES continued to protest government abuses of human rights with the
same extra-institutional tactics. They continued to petition foreign embassies and the
Church to intervene on their behalf. They protested in the streets and continued to publish
denunciations in the newspapers (CO-MADRES July/August 1990; Diario Latino August
30,1990: El Mundo August 18, 1990;Sentir Con El Pueblo March 1993). They appealed
to Congressmen Moakley and Mel Levine, and Senator Edward Kennedy, Christopher
Dodd, and Patrick Leahy, who lobbied to end military aid and condemned human rights
violations by the Salvadoran government (CO-MADRES Bulletin Summer 1990: 2; CO-
MADRES Bulletin Winter 1992; Tula 1993). The Friends of CO-MADRES provided
resources and an emergency response network that organized telephone campaigns to
Cristiani, the High Command, the U.S. Embassy, the U.N. and U.S. Congressional
Representatives (CO-MADRES Bulletin Summer 1990: 10).6 1  They appealed to
humanitarian organizations and international solidarity organizations for material aid, and in
1989 received funds from feminists in the Norwegian Labor Party to purchase a house for
use as an office (Schirmer 1993: 41).
61 The number of people the CO-MADRES were able to contact through the emergency response network
is not readily available.
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Though the CO-MADRES continued to rely on the tactics they developed in the seventies
and eighties, they also began to integrate themselves more formally into the organized left.
America Sosa described the importance of coalition building to the CO-MADRES in the
early nineties:
Perhaps we could say the most important work that CO-MADRES is doing at this
time is integrating our work into broader coalitions, broader movements in our
country. For example, we are part of a National Debate. We are part of a National
Coalition just recently formed. The Coalition involves different sectors in El
Salvador like federated unions, peasant organizations, women's organizations,
university groups, and small business sectors or groups. This coalition discusses
the needs of the nation and how we can join in one single document to present our
position to the government or the inter-party coalition, where various political party
members participate in their own legal discussions.
(Christian Social Action 1990: 11)
The CO-MADRES played an active role in this coalition and in formulating their demands
(Tula 1993). The CO-MADRES also developed stronger ties to labor during this period:
Celia Beltrin, a leader of the CO-MADRES, was elected to the executive committee of the
National Unity of Salvadoran Workers (Unidad Nacional de los Trajabadores Salvadorefios
or UNTS).
The CO-MADRES began to work closely with CO-FENESTRAS on specific
projects.62 The two organizations worked together to form the Women's International
Network for Development and Democracy in El Salvador (WINDS). WINDS provided
support for women's' self-development projects in El Salvador. At the Inaugural Forum in
October of 1990, the CO-MADRES and CO-FENESTRAS stated the following goals for
first forum:
(1) To convene international women from diverse sectors to celebrate the birth of
WINDS
(2) To promote a dynamic relationship of mutual support between the international
women's movement and a developing women's movement in El Salvador.
62 CO-FENESTRAS is the women's division of FENESTRAS, one of the CO-MADRES closest allies.
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(3) To educate the international women's community about the current situation of
Salvadoran women.
(4) To strategize to provide technical, financial, and political support to women's
self development projects in El Salvador.
(5) To commission an International Women's Delegation to El Salvador which will
visit potential WINDS projects, observe and report back on political and human
rights conditions as they affect women and children.
(CO-MADRES Bulletin Summer 1990: 8)
WINDS funded women's development projects throughout El Salvador, including some
of the CO-MADRES projects. WINDS was run by a Board of Directors that included
representatives of CO-MADRES and CO-FENESTRAS as well as North American
feminist activists and academics.
The CO-MADRES were also instrumental in the formation of Mujeres Por la Dignidad y
la Vida (Women for Dignity and Life, known as DIGNAS). The CO-MADRES were
active in the planning of the first meeting of the DIGNAS, which took place in July 1990
(CO-MADRES July/August 1990: 4-5). The first meeting brought together several
hundred women from different organizations, including peasants organizations, at the
National University in San Salvador. The conference included panels on Women and
Human Rights, Women and Health, Discrimination and Marginalization of Women, and
Women and War (CO-MADRES July/August 1990; CO-MADRES Bulletin Summer
1990).
The CO-MADRES also participated in the coalition of Mujeres '94. The CO-MADRES
worked with fourteen other organizations to present a platform for women on a variety of
issues which concern the CO-MADRES (Tula 1993). Their participation in the coalition
reflects a new strategic development that responded to changes in the political context:
progressive parties were becoming part of institutional politics, and this change opened
new institutional channels for organizations to represent their interests. Women's
organizations were increasingly available allies as women's political organizations operated
more independently from the FMLN. The CO-MADRES and the other participants in the
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Mujeres'94 utilized these new opportunities to represent interests directly to the full
spectrum of political parties, introducing a new strategy for representing women's gender
interests within the Salvadoran context.
Gender Interests and the Political Process
The shifting structure of political opportunities in the early eighties created a climate in
which new channels of representation for gender interests could be created and utilized.
Although the CO-MADRES continued to prioritize human rights interests, they increased
their activities around practical and strategic gender interests. The CO-MADRES
continued to press the government to respect human rights and to implement the
recommendations of the peace accords (Stephen 1993: 18). The CO-MADRES were able
to expand their activities around practical and strategic gender interests: coalitions of
women's organizations provided new channels to represent women's interests, creating
conditions under which the CO-MADRES were able to represent a political agenda that was
increasingly specific to women..
The CO-MADRES prioritized practical gender interests within their human rights
agenda. In their description of their organization, they began to cite women's self-
development projects as a priority objective. The CO-MADRES organized sewing
workshops, day care centers, cooperative arts and craft businesses, health clinics, and
centers for women and children who have been dislocated during the war (CO-MADRES
July/August 1990; CO-MADRES Bulletins 1990-92; Schirmer 1993: 45-46).
Projects like the sewing workshops and day care centers serve practical gender
interests. The rationale for the project was that poor women who lacked the education and
skills to support themselves when their husbands and family members disappeared or died
in the war needed to find a way to continue to support their families: the CO-MADRES
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aspired to "endow women with theoretical and practical skills...which will enable them to
obtain work and provide subsisitence for their families" (CO-MADRES Grant Proposal,
May 1990).6 3 The day-care centers also represented the practical gender interests of
working mothers, by providing those mothers a reasonable means to balance their work
and familiy responsibilities.6 4
It is plausible that some of these projects represented strategic gender interests as well
as practical gender interests. For example, the CO-MADRES planned to run parenting
classes at the day-care centers which would encourage fathers to become more involved. It
could be argued that the day-care centers addressed both strategic and practical gender
interests at the community level, by providing a service women need given the current
expectations about their role as women, and planting the seeds for future changes in that
role. Such a claim, however, would require more detailed information about whether the
classes came to pass that could not be obtained at this writing.
The collaborative effort to form WINDS enabled the CO-MADRES and other
organizations to expand their development projects. WINDS provided funding for many
of the CO-MADRES projects. WINDS responded to grant proposals from CO-MADRES
for the sewing workshops, health clinics, refugee assistance programs, and other projects.
Outside funding was critical to these projects: in the case of the sewing project, the CO-
MADRES estimated that they would be able to generate approximately five hundred and
twenty dollars of an estimated nineteen thousand dollar total cost.
63 The workshop was structured to include time for political analysis (raising consciousness about the class
struggle) as well as instruction in various sewing techniques, so it could certainly be argued that the
workshop served strategic class interests as well as practical gender interests (CO-MADRES Grant
Proposal, May 1990).
6 4 All of the day care centers in El Salvador were run by the state. The CO-MADRES designed the day-
care centers to present an alternative model to the state run day care. A CO-MADRE described the rationale
for alternative day-care centers to Jennifer Schirmer: "No one believed it could be done, because the day-care
centers here have all been run by the government with uniformed children, hair cut to the same length,
standing in orderly lines...And what is it we want to do with these day care centers? Do we want to
continue with the same attitudes? No, we must change them: the fathers must begin to change their
thinking about the rights of the child, and about the mother!" (Schirmer 1993: 45).
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The CO-MADRES also expanded their human rights agenda to include some of
women's strategic gender interests. An ongoing interest for the CO-MADRES was the
problem of rape. The issue of rape, which was addressed initially on a case-by-case basis,
was increasingly addressed as part of an analysis of women's specific position in society.
The CO-MADRES denunciations of rape gradually shifted from denunciation of specific
acts that violated human rights to denunciations of the problem of rape more generally. A
statement by Alicia Panamefio de Garcia during an interview with Lynn Stephen illustrated
the kind of connection the CO-MADRES made between the use of rape by the military and
the problem of rape in society by the early nineties:
Rape was one of those things we didn't really think about. We weren't really
prepared for it happening to us. We didn't think that the military would
systematically be using these practices. So the first few women were detained and
they were raped and because we are taught to be pure, they didn't talk about that.
They didn't say "this happened to me..."
(Stephen 1993: 12)
Alicia linked the specific problem of rape by the military to the more general problem of
silence and shame about rape in society. The silence about rape made it difficult for women
to come forward and denounce rape because rape was still a source of shame for the victim.
The CO-MADRES began to denounce societal and familial attitudes about the victims of
rape as well as the specific acts by the military.6 5 Workshops they ran in the late eighties
and early nineties helped the CO-MADRES talk about their own problems with the
aftermath of rape.
The CO-MADRES began to prioritize an agenda for women's rights that went beyond
condemning rape. They condemned gender inequality in one of their monthly bulletins:
65 Many of the women feared being rejected by their families and spouses if they publicly revealed their
rape (Stephen 1993: 12). Female activists have also faced ridicule by members of the right for their
accusations: in a series of columns which ran in 1991 in "El Mundo", women who worked with the
problem of rape and battered women were characterized as "too ugly to get husbands and because of that they
had time to run around doing these kinds of things" (Ready 1993: 3).
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The Salvadoran woman is discriminated against and marginalized by the
political, economic, and social system of her country and not by the Salvadoran
man, and for that reason our struggle is for the transformation of the society into a
democratic, independent system, where the values and abilities which every one of
the women possess is recognized.
(CO-MADRES July/Aug. 1990: 4-5)
Although they were always careful to distinguish between condemning the system that
discriminated against them and their male allies in their public statements, they began to
reiterate this general condemnation of sexism more frequently. They also began to devote
more time to specific issues, including domestic violence, sexuality, prostitution, and
econimic rights (Christian Social Action 1990; Schirmer 1993; Stephen 1993; Tula 1993).
The CO-MADRES addressed women's rights within the human rights community. The
CO-MADRES and DIGNAS planned an international Conference for January 1993
entitled, "The Rights of Women as A Subject of Human Rights." The conference would
bring together Salvadoran women from various organization as well as women from other
countries. The objectives of the conference were :
(1) To educate Salvadoran and international women about the rights of women as a
subject of human rights.
(2) To inform and educate about the Convention about the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination against women as an instrument of struggle
(3) To discuss and elaborate strategies together in which we will bring together
Salvadoran and international women, struggling for our human rights
(4) To publish the results of this conference in a simplified version so that it can be
studied and discussed by groups of women in El Salvador and other Spanish
speaking countries
(CO-MADRES Grant Proposal 1992)
The proposed panels included gender roles, prostitution, political rights, education,
employment, health and family planning, social and economic rights, rural women, and
family law.
The CO-MADRES were increasingly able to politicize their strategic gender interests
through participation in coalitions of women's organizations beginning in 1991. The CO-
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MADRES worked with other organizations, including DIGNAS and CO-FENESTRAS to
pressure the Salvadoran government and political parties to provide protection for women's
rights within El Salvador. Perhaps the most significant channel for the CO-MADRES
strategic gender interets was the Mujeres '94. At this writing, the platform was not yet
available, but was expected to include many strategic gender interests. Issues that were on
the agenda for debate include reproductive rights, sexuality, women and land reform,
domestic violence, and political participation. The CO-MADRES were able to address
their strategic gender interests, such as domestic violence and political participation, in this
debate, and may be able to represent those interests to the political paries through the
Mujeres '94.
Although the expansion of the CO-MADRES agenda occurred throughout the Salvadoran
political process, the nineties brought about new opportunities to expand and politicize
practical and strategic gender interests. The graph below illustrates the trend towards
expansion and politicization of gender interest:
CO-MADRES Representation
of Gender Interests
Strategic
1993
1991
1989
Practioal
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Between 1989 and 1991, the CO-MADRES expanded and prioritized women's self-
development projects. Those projects represented practical gender interests at the level of
the local community. Between 1991 and 1993, the CO-MADRES expanded their
participation in coalitions of women's organizations. Those coalitions politicized strategic
and practical gender interests, and sought to represent them at a national level through
institutional channels. Collaborations with other women's organizations and support from
international solidarity networks provided the material and political support necessary for
the creation of an agenda that specifically prioritized women's gender interests. These
kinds of coalitions were increasingly possible as the peace process progres-sed, and
institutional channels of representation gradually opened. The increased capacity of the
CO-MADRES to represent practical and strategic gender interests during this period was
possible because of increased availability and independence of women's organizations as
well as the opening of new channels of representation within the formal political system.
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Conclusion
The CO-MADRES proved capable of representing a range of strategic and gender
interests to varying degrees. They represented practical gender interests in the community
by developing projects that helped women care for their families, including sewing
workshops and day care centers. At the same time, they represented strategic gender
interests: specifically, they questioned societies' complicitous silence about rape and
domestic violence and challenged ideas about women's political and economic inequality.
The degree to which CO-MADRES represented gender interests varied over time. As
political opportunities and constraints developed, the CO-MADRES capacity to represent
strategic gender interests, especially at a political level, rose and declined, as the graph
below illustrates:
CO-MADRES Representation
of Gender Interests, 1977-93
Strategic
1993
1982 1989
1985
1977 1980
Practical
Between 1977 and 1980, when the Church and the organized opposition offered key
support, the politicization of practical gender interests increased greatly and the CO-
MADRES gradually began to represent strategic gender interests within their local
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community. Between 1980 and 1982, under conditions of heavy repression, political
representation of practical gender interests declined. Between 1982 and 1985, the CO-
MADRES steadily expanded their practical gender agenda with material resources from the
Church and humanitarian organizations and political support from a re-emerging opposition
movement. After 1985, the CO-MADRES continued to expand their practical gender
agenda, and began to politicize strategic gender interests (specifically the problem of rape)
to a limited degree. The material support of the "Friends of CO-MADRES" and the
political support of opposition organizations like COPPES facilitated the gradual
expansion. Between 1989 and 1991, the CO-MADRES expanded and prioritized women's
self- development projects that represented both practical and strategic gender interests at
the level of the local community: this expansion was facilitated by material aid from
WINDS and cooperation from other women's organizations, like CO-FENESTRAS
Between 1991 and 1993, the CO-MADRES expanded their gender agenda to include broad
demands for improvements in women's political and economic status and included both
practical and strategic gender interests. Alliances with other women's organizations were
critical to the generation of a broad agenda for women's gender interests as the peace
process progressed, and formal coalitions of women's organizations provided a new
channel to represent those demands.
From the case of the CO-MADRES, we can surmise that femenina organizations are not
inherently incapable of representing strategic gender interests. The CO-MADRES
represented strategic as well as practical interests. The case signals the importance of
external constraints and opportunities in determining the extent to which femenina
organizations are capable of representing strategic gender interests.
The CO-MADRES are fairly representative of other femenina organizations. In El
Salvador, the development of other femenina organizations was comparable to that of the
CO-MADRES: they represented both strategic and practical interests to different degrees
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throughout the eighties and nineties, and increasingly politicized strategic gender interests
between 1991-93 (Ready 1993). Outside of El Salvador, femenina organizations represent
a wide range of practical and strategic gender interests. Chilean pobladoras speak of a
"popular feminism" that incorporates issues ranging from survival strategies for poor
women to workshops on sexuality (Schild 1992). Femenina organizations throughout
Latin America confront issues like domestic violence and unequal division of labor in the
home (Craske 1993; Lind 1992; Schirmer 1993: Stephen 1992).
Although a single case study is not sufficient to establish all the necessary conditions for
femenina organizations to represent strategic gender interests, some conditions that were
necessary in this case include political opening, supportive allies, and independence from
non-supportive parties. Chilean femenina organizations, for example, increasingly
represented strategic gender interests as the political system opened in the late eighties.
Women's organizations (both femenina and feminista) gradually became more independent
from the organized left and created formal alliances with other women's organizations
(Molina 1986; 1989). Some of these coalitions, such as MOMUPO (Movement of
Women Pobladoras), identified themselves as feminist and politicized women's strategic
gender interests (Fisher 1993). Through participation in MOMUPO, femenina
organizations increasingly represented strategic gender interests on a political level (Schild
1992).
A future comparative study would shed more light on the necessary conditions. A
particularly beneficial study would include women's organizations that apparently did not
politicize strategic gender interests: groups such as the Madres of the Plaza de Mayo of
Argentina and the Agrupacion de Familiares of Chile. A comparative study would provide
a better basis to explain why femenina organizations represent or do not represent strategic
gender interests. A question I have not addressed in this study is what the internal
organizational conditions need be for an organization to represent strategic gender interests.
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Organizations indeed respond to external constraints and opportunities, but it is ultimately
internal dynamics that shape that response. An opportunity to represent an interest does not
guarantee that an organization will represent that interest. Future studies of organizations
that apparently have the opportunity to represent an interest but do not would provide a
valuable contribution to the analysis of femenina organizations.
Although the fact that CO-MADRES and other femenina organizations represent strategic
gender interests does challenge the foundation of arguments that the movimiento femenino
is a crisis mobilization, I would argue that it is not sufficient to build an argument that
women's movements in Latin America have constructed new and durable channels of
representation. I would rather argue that femenina organizations potentially offer new
channels for representing gender interests. An evaluation of the "newness" of the kind of
representation women's movements provide should be based on a more exhaustive study
of women's organizations, inclusive of conservative organizations as well as progressive
ones. An evaluation of the durability of the women's movement will have to be based on
the movement's ability to survive or its demise, not on the kinds of interests it appears to
represent: feminist movements are as subject to demise as are non-feminist movements.
The CO-MADRES and other femenina organizations should be evaluated for their particular
contributions to the representation of women's gender interests, rather than being
dismissed as archaic forms of organizations or romanticized as the new vanguard of
women's political activism.
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